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Relations between the world’s largest 
democracy, India, and the oldest, the United 
States, have never been better. The pre-
eminent sign of this improved state of 
relations is, of course, the recent concord 
between the governments of both countries 
that proposes bilateral cooperation on a 
variety of fronts, from space to agriculture, but 
especially in relation to civilian nuclear 
cooperation. Bilateral agreements signed in 
July 2005 in Washington, D.C., and following 
President Bush’s visit to India in March 2006,1
were hailed as historic, seemingly marking the 
end of “estrangement,” to borrow Amba-
ssador Dennis Kux’s characterization of 
relations between the two countries.2 But for 
all its claims to be “historic,” the agreements 
were not greeted equally, or with equal 
acclaim, in both capitals.
In official Washington, which, for the 
most part recognized a new relationship with 
India as both overdue and of considerable 
significance, evaluation of the terms of the 
new relationship was immediately framed in 
terms of a stark choice: had the United States 
decided to put aside its long-standing policy 
seeking to prevent the rise of new nuclear 
powers—nonproliferation—in favor of mee-
ting a new strategic objective, i.e., building 
and sustaining better ties with a rising Asian 
power, India? This apparent choice in turn 
raised other questions. How does one measure 
the relative weight of two strategic objectives?  
What signal would be sent to other possible 
proliferators? What would India do for the 
United States? Regardless of the outcome of 
the ongoing debate, the basic question that 
will continue to be debated for some time to 
come, especially as states like Iran and North 
Korea rattle the nuclear cage—is the trade-off 
worth it?
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In India, the political class was unan-
imous in seeing the agreement as tacit U.S. 
recognition of India’s status as a de-facto
nuclear weapons state, a claim that was 
repeated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of 
parliament.3 Criticism of the agreement in 
New Delhi took a very different tack. Critics of
the agreement—representing both left and
right—have largely posed their concerns in
terms of the future costs of closer ties with the 
United States. Was the deal a sellout by 
diluting Indian sovereignty? What did it 
augur for retaining an independent foreign 
policy, a sine qua non for postcolonial India’s
aspirations to be recognized as a great power?
Did it curtail India’s ability to defend itself by 
imposing limits on fissile material and nuclear
weapons production? In India too, the same 
question—is it worth it?—was being asked; 
the implicit trade-off, however, is altogether
different.
From even this brief outline, it becomes 
obvious that the concord means very different 
things to the two parties involved. This is 
hardly surprising, given the vast inequalities
in material power and international influence
between the U.S. and India, and with their
very different political histories and elite
cultures; how could it be otherwise? Even 
accepting that both countries had for some 
time sought, and worked hard at developing,
a new and positive framework for bilateral
relations, what came as a surprise to most
observers was the centrality accorded to the
nuclear dimension in this new partnership. 
Foregrounding what many have considered 
the most contentious aspect of India-U.S. 
relations is counter-intuitive and points to an 
intriguing puzzle. Rephrased as two related
questions, this puzzle becomes: (a) could India 
and the United States could have improved 
the state of bilateral relations without dealing
with the nuclear issue; and, (b) would it have
been easier to postpone addressing such a 
contentious matter until such a time when
mutual trust was higher? Responding “yes” to
both questions defines the arguably prudent 
and easier course of action; but that is not
what happened. That the U.S. and India chose
not to take this relatively easier path needs 
explaining.
Two earlier moments of possible change, 
the first during the Kennedy Administration
and the other during the Clinton Admin-
istration, never reached this threshold, raising
the obvious question, why now? This study 
argues that a conjuncture of material, political,
and conceptual changes operating at three
different levels of analysis was necessary for
the radical transformation of bilateral relations
that is now underway. At the conceptual level, 
this study argues that the qualitative change 
now imaginable in India-U.S. relations is best
understood as an outcome of treating the 
nuclear question as defined by India as the
lynchpin to better relations between the two 
countries. This is what defines the “historic”
nature of this agreement: the reversal of a
position held for three decades, when the
nuclear issue, as defined by the United States’ 
non-proliferation policy, was the greatest 
obstacle to better relations between India and
the U.S. This new conceptual framework was 
the outcome of the work of a determined
coalition of individuals working from the U.S.
Embassy in Delhi and in Washington, D.C.,
with direct political access to the White House.
Operating at the political,4 or more accurately, 
bureaucratic level, this coalition successfully 
engineered the levers of government to
circumvent and block internal dissent and
institutional resistance. Neither of these
transformations, both working in the context 
of bilateral ties between India and the U.S., 
would have been possible, however, without 
structural changes in the international system.
These included the rise of China, and by
extension, the reassertion of an Asian
geopolitics; a U.S. administration that is
deeply skeptical of multilateral institutions
and willing to privilege strategic consider-
ations over one-size-fits-all universal policies; 
and finally, India’s growing economic clout
and increasing likelihood of soon playing an 
increasingly important role in global economic 
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affairs. This study argues that none of these
factors, by themselves, could have made this
transformation happen. Changes at all three
levels needed to come together at the same 
time; hence, this study affirms the high degree
of contingency in this development and also
implies that it is unlikely to be easily 
replicated.
The rest of this study is devoted to filling
in the details of this argument and explaining
how this transformation came about. The 
study begins with a survey of U.S.-India 
relations over the last half-century with an eye 
to understanding how the relationship
acquired its current form. While a funda-
mental disagreement on nuclear issues clearly
casts a long shadow on India-U.S. relations 
from 1974 onward, it does not mean that there
has never been cooperation between these two
countries, whether in the early years following
India’s political independence, or following
the end of the Cold War. However, this 
history of limited and cautious cooperation
has to be set against what might be called a
growing deficit of trust, based on long Indian
memories of American support for its enemies 
and actions taken that were perceived to be
against India’s national interests.
Since the 1990s, with openings led by the
U.S. Defense Department in particular, 
functional relations between the two countries
in areas other than the nuclear dimension
have improved considerably, aided to no 
small extent by India’s growing economic
clout and importance. It is striking how even 
India’s announcement, following a series of 
nuclear tests in May 1998, that it should now 
be considered a nuclear weapons power, 
would only set back this burgeoning
relationship temporarily. Taking place at the
same time were important changes in
American representations of India, as a country
and as a civilization. These representational
shifts constitute an independent, culturally
defined process that has been underway since 
the late 1990s. This contentious, but also
cooperative, history leads up to what we now 
know was a turning point in the early years of 
the new century when key players helped 
define new terms around which the
relationship would be defined.
The following section analyzes the 
moment when the big question—did the
improvement of bilateral relations have to
take on the nuclear issue—was still very open.
From New Delhi’s standpoint, the nuclear 
issue, and restricted access to dual-use high
technologies were, for a variety of historical, 
symbolic, and political reasons, the corner-
stone of its problems with the world’s most
powerful country. By that token, from the 
Indian point of view, there could be no clearer 
statement of a U.S. desire to improve relations
than an approach that recognized India’s
nuclear program as legitimate and outside the 
non-proliferation framework. Recognizing this
opportunity, and working to overcome the 
considerable Indian deficit in trust of U.S. 
intentions and reliability, key insiders 
responded by confronting the nuclear issue 
directly.
Recasting the improving, but far from
self-sustaining, state of bilateral relations with
India was made possible by accepting the 
meanings and significance India attributed to 
its nuclear program (its strategic importance,
political history, and domestic identification
with international status), and thus making
this intervention credible to New Delhi. The 
prudent but conservative approach to 
improving bilateral relations, an approach that
would have argued for sidelining the nuclear 
issue until a later date, was put aside in favor 
of a radical reformulation of the relationship 
which was achieved by marginalizing non-
proliferation concerns (and advocates) in favor 
of a new strategic alignment. Generalized U.S.
institutional concerns about sources of
international insecurity—proliferation as a 
negative threat—were pitted against a new 
strategic conceptual map that made a case that
it was in the U.S. national interest to have
closer ties with India—a positive valence of 
national security. But this was a tactical
decision seeking also, in the same stroke, to
overcome U.S. bureaucratic inertia and
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resistance to better relations by casting a new
relationship with India in these terms.
Bureaucratic insiders would argue that the
only way of overriding statutory limits on 
better relations with India was to recast the
relationship in terms of a national interest that
would trump the legal.
Finally, the appendix to this study
discusses the content of the debates over the 
nuclear agreement in Washington and New 
Delhi respectively and concludes by assessing 
the merits of some of the claims and counter-
claims being made by the many sides to these
debates. 5
U.S.-India Relations During the
Cold War 
The following section offers a historical
overview of India-U.S. relations, including
brief moments of cooperation. The discussion
is structured around two turning points: 1974,
when India detonated a “peaceful nuclear 
explosion,” and 1990–91, the end of the Cold
War and the ensuing change in global political
forces and alignments. The analysis shows 
that the main vector of change in bilateral
relations was geopolitical; the main source of 
continuity was U.S. non-proliferation policy.
The net effect was to produce an Indian 
“deficit in trust” vis-à-vis the United States.6
The Early Years
Early U.S. support, and civil society
admiration, for India’s struggle for political
independence soon gave way to policies 
shaped by the exigencies of the Cold War. As 
a result, India’s relations with the United
States in the early postcolonial period were 
largely shaped within a multilateral frame. 
Starting with the Korean crisis in 1950, and 
continuing into the Indochina conflict and 
peace negotiations a few years later, a
diplomatically hyperactive India promoted
multilateral efforts to help mediate these
crises, often alienating U.S. policy makers in 
the process. From the Indian point of view, its 
involvement in these regional crises was 
driven by both self-interest and an effort to 
democratize international relations.7 Fearing 
that the United States would resort to the use 
of nuclear weapons in both Korea and
Indochina if faced with military defeat, India 
justified its own involvement as necessary to
help avert that possibility. But also, as seen 
from the Indian viewpoint, these crises were 
in no small part driven by the absence of
Asian powers in the inner circles of world
politics. Highly sensitive to the racially 
exclusive politics of the period, and outraged 
by the efforts of European states to continue 
colonial rule in Asia and Africa after World 
War II,8 India sought to get the United States 
and other major powers to accept that Asian
powers had the right to be involved in matters
concerning them directly.9 Over time, these 
principles would converge into a policy of
non-alignment, a foreign policy stance that 
was read by Washington policy makers in the
1950s as an immoral policy of neutralism.10
From the U.S. standpoint, bilateral
relations with India were initially mediated,
and hampered, by British efforts to continue to 
dominate its former colony and geopolitical
zone of influence that ended with the 
denouement represented by Suez in 1956.11
Through the 1950s, a geopolitical perspective
dominated U.S. strategy, leading to a policy of 
“containment” of Communist influence
through treaty arrangements with countries
bordering China and U.S.S.R.12 India would 
have been a vital link in that chain, as many
had hoped and encouraged, but non-
alignment and effective diplomacy by 
Pakistan’s military rulers prevented that from
coming about.13
Even as the two countries appeared
always to take opposing positions on major
international issues, in fact India and the U.S.
worked well together on a number of issues
outside the glare of public scrutiny. For
instance, in Korea, actions taken by India as
chairman of the Korean Armistice
Commission largely favored the U.S. and U.N.
perspective, India was used as a conduit by
the State Department to convey messages to 
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and from China, and Indian and U.S. covert
forces worked together to monitor Chinese
military movements in the Tibetan plateau.14
U.S. advisors helped shape Indian develop-
ment programs, especially the community
development program and urban planning,
and was a major donor of aid to India, while 
the Ford Foundation set up its first overseas
office in New Delhi in 1951.
Even as public disagreements and quiet 
cooperation continued between the two states, 
if there was one constant in U.S. strategic
perceptions of India, it was always to see India 
in relation to China. Geo-politically, there may 
have been a hyphen connecting India and
Pakistan; ideologically, however, India was 
the great counterweight to the People’s
Republic. The stakes were high. The degree of
relative success in the respective efforts of 
these two largest Asian countries, who had
adopted such radically different political paths
towards not dissimilar ends of economic
development and social change, was
understood to be of great significance in
influencing and shaping the behavior of other
newly independent countries in Asia and
Africa. Strongly influenced by this line of 
thinking, the Kennedy Administration made a 
serious effort to create a new relationship with
India. As Robert McMahon notes, during his
short Senate career “Kennedy discussed India 
with more frequency and with more passion
than any other nation.” Once elected
president, Kennedy stacked his South Asia
team with advocates of an improved
relationship with India, even at the expense of
U.S. ally Pakistan. In an uncanny echo of
arguments being used today, McMahon goes 
to say, “India’s importance to Kennedy
administration strategists derived also from 
their fixation with China’s presumed
importance to the Asian equilibrium.”15
Yet even with a strong supporter of India
in the White House, the relationship waxed 
and waned. India’s efforts to maintain an
independent foreign policy, its postcolonial
sensitivities about national sovereignty, and
troubled regional relations were set against a
single-minded U.S. focus on the Cold War
struggle; the net effect made it very difficult
for bilateral relations to achieve a steady state. 
India’s humiliation in a brief war against
China in 1962 gave the U.S. a unique
opportunity to develop closer ties, built 
especially around the sale of military
equipment and consensus on a common
enemy, but it soon passed. India made matters 
worse by announcing a major purchase of 
Soviet MiG-21 jets just as Congress was
debating the annual foreign aid bill.16 With the 
Johnson Administration, things only got
worse, and the outbreak of the 1965 war
between India and Pakistan re-inscribed, once
again, the hyphen connecting India and
Pakistan in U.S. policy. Following the joint
decision by the U.S. and U.K. to impose an
arms embargo against the sub-continent, and
the aid squeeze imposed on India during
successive years of drought, relations between 
the two countries soured further.17
In 1965, multilateral negotiations towards
a non-proliferation treaty (NPT) began at the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. 
India had entered negotiations in the
expectation that the NPT would be a step 
towards general disarmament, a foreign
policy objective it had long been in favor of.
Although the NPT’s Article VI contains a
weak promise by states possessing nuclear 
weapons (NWS) “to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
Treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international
control,” even at the time of its coming into
force, it was understood by the superpowers 
that this commitment was only a sop to the
non-nuclear world, more likely to be honored 
in the breach.18 George Perkovich points out
that realizing that the final version of the NPT 
was unlikely to offer India security 
guarantees, especially against China, “in 1967
and 1968, the question shifted from whether
India should actually produce nuclear
weapons to whether India should sign a treaty
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relinquishing the right to produce nuclear
weapons.”19
Unlike the Partial and Comprehensive 
Test Ban treaties, which can be seen as
globally constraining legal mechanisms
seeking to slow down and eventually halt the
growth of the total number of nuclear
weapons in the world, the final version of the
NPT is best understood as a legal instrument
that could not overcome the inherent
ambivalence of nuclear technologies.20 While 
seeking to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons technology beyond those states that
had already tested nuclear devices, the NPT 
effectively froze the nuclear status quo while 
doing little to reduce the value of nuclear
weapons as prime instruments of policy and
prestige. India’s concerns revolved around
two issues, the criterion of exception, and the
foreclosing of its nuclear options. At the heart
of the treaty is a distinction between states
that had detonated nuclear explosives before 
January 1, 1967, and those that had not.
Overall nuclear capability was not the issue of 
distinction, proof of explosive ability was. This
artificial distinction created a system of 
“global nuclear apartheid,” in the strong
words of the Indian negotiator, V.C. Trivedi. 
This difference would matter considerably for
India, which as always, was seeking to keep 
its nuclear options open. The NPT would
come into force in 1970, with Pakistan, Israel 
and Cuba joining India as non-signatories.
The new decade ushered in a new 
administration. President Nixon made little
effort to improve ties with India. In 1971, his 
national security advisor Henry Kissinger 
used Pakistan as a secret conduit in his effort
to improve ties with Communist China, the 
most aggressive transformation of U.S. foreign
policy since the beginning of the Cold War. At
the end of that year, with Indian armies
moving to liberate Dhaka from the clutches of
West Pakistan, Kissinger flexed American
military muscle in an effort to “prevent ‘a
Soviet stooge, supported by Soviet arms’, from
overrunning an ally” and encouraged the
Chinese to open a new front in the war to
“scare those goddamn Indians to death.”21
Finally, in an effort to show the Chinese (not
the Pakistanis) the reliability of the U.S. as an 
ally, the Nixon administration took the 
decision to send a nuclear-armed Seventh 
Fleet, led by the USS Enterprise, into the Bay
of Bengal during the crisis. Without a clear
tactical objective, this dubious gesture only 
alienated India and did little to help U.S. ally 
Pakistan. Following this, India-U.S. relations
hit a new low. As every U.S. diplomat who 
has served in or passed through New Delhi 
can confirm, the “Enterprise” incident has 
never been forgotten by Indian elites.
1974 and After 
In May 1974, India detonated a plutonium
device under the Rajasthan desert, becoming
the sixth country to test a nuclear explosive. 
The explosion was termed a “peaceful nuclear
explosion” (PNE), not a bomb, echoing India’s
reservations during the NPT negotiations.22
The rationale for the Indian decision continues
to be debated today. At the time, domestic
factors seemed to be the dominant imperative:
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was under
severe stress from political opponents, and the 
timing of the explosion seems to have been
aimed at using this event to bolster her
flagging political fortunes. Since the decision 
to test was taken in 1972, it could be argued
that this was a decision made from a position
of great strength, rather than weakness,
following India’s decisive victory over 
Pakistan in 1971. Taking a slightly longer-term
view, pressure from domestic lobbies, notably
nuclear scientists, was an important factor
explaining the decision to test.23 Speaking 
years after the 1974 explosion, one of the key 
architects of the PNE described it as in fact a
nuclear weapons test, rather than merely a
“demonstration” of capability (the contem-
poraneous term employed by Indira Gandhi).
However, this statement is best seen as a 
blatant effort to rescript history to make it
appear that India had always intended to
build nuclear weapons.24 Future events would
show that India had not made the political
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decision to develop a nuclear weapons
arsenal. Notwithstanding various possible 
reasons for testing in 1974, its impact on India-
U.S. relations would take decades to recover
from.
Canada, which had provided India with
the CIRUS reactor that was used to produce 
the plutonium used in the explosive device,
and the United States, which had supplied 
heavy water that may have been used in the 
reactor,25 along with the rest of the inter-
national community, reacted angrily and 
vehemently to the 1974 test. This adverse
reaction to India’s 1974 test was to shape
relations between the two countries until the 
end of the Cold War. Sanctions were imposed 
on the Indian nuclear program, and
discussions began in the U.S. Congress that
would eventually lead, under the Carter 
Administration, to the passing of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The Act would 
define the legal terms for U.S. nuclear
relations with the rest of the world, and
required ending cooperation with countries
that violated nuclear cooperation agreements
with the United States, and also with those
that detonated nuclear explosives.
However, U.S. commitment to its non-
proliferation policies has, by the admission of 
a leading expert, been variable. Although “the
underlying assumption of nonproliferation 
policy is that the spread of nuclear weapons is 
a threat to U.S. and international security,” in
practice both commercial and other strategic
interests have led to a mixed record.26 For 
India, there was no better proof of that
inconsistency than the repeated waivers given
to Pakistan during the Afghanistan war. India,
by contrast, although like Pakistan a non-
signatory to the NPT, would continue to be
subject to U.S. nuclear sanctions, setting back
the progress of its civilian nuclear program 
considerably. By contrast, Pakistan would take
advantage of its close ties with the U.S.
government to achieve a covert nuclear
capability. In a pattern that continues today,
while the practical performance of the 
executive branch of the U.S. government has
displayed a mixed reaction towards horizontal
proliferation—turning a blind eye toward the
nuclear activities of allies Israel and Pakistan,
while castigating the behavior of similarly 
behaving non-allies like India and Cuba, the
slack in policy implementation has been taken
up by the legislative branch. Less constrained
by political expediency and more genuinely
concerned about the spread of nuclear 
weapons, Congress is always more able to
articulate, and legislate on the basis of, 
universal principles. Executive branch
behavior towards India would, from this point
onward, be constrained by statutory pressure
from Congress in relation to nuclear matters.
India had been tilting towards the Soviet 
Union for some time, formalized by the
signing of a 20-year “peace and friendship”
agreement in 1971. Events taking place later
that decade would only strengthen that
relationship. In 1979, the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan, and while India was
hardly in favor of a superpower practically on
its borders, American reaction to this invasion 
would ensure that U.S.-India relations 
remained in cold storage. Pakistan, blessed by
its location once again, would become the 
beneficiary of billions of dollars of U.S. aid, as
President Reagan would begin a covert policy
of supporting the Afghan freedom fighters or 
mujahideen. Massive U.S. military and 
economic support for Pakistan could only be
seen in negative terms in New Delhi, though
some efforts were made to improve regional 
relations once General Zia’s regime had 
ended.27 By the end of the 1980s, these two
factors, the 1974 test (by its legislative
outcome), and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan (by its geopolitical outcome),
ensured that relations between the U.S. and
India remained cool.
The End of the Cold War 
With the end of the Cold War and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, soon followed 
by the overwhelming defeat of Iraq in the first 
Gulf War, new possibilities in U.S.-India 
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relations opened up. The first step was taken 
by the U.S. Defense Department, encouraged
particularly by the Navy, who sought in India 
a partner for its geo-strategic mission of
keeping open the world’s sea-lanes. In
December 1990, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Henry Rowen visited India “with a large 
delegation.”28 This was followed by a visit to
India by the commanders of U.S. Pacific 
Command Claude Kickleighter and Charles
Larson.29  On his return, Kickleighter prepared
a proposal for expanded U.S.-Indian defense 
cooperation, including annual exchange of
visits, regular seminars and discussions, and 
joint training and participation in military
exercises. The pace of interaction picked up at
once with a series of high-level meetings
between the leadership of the Indian military
and U.S. Pacific Command. In May 1992, the
two navies conducted their first-ever joint
exercise, and close relations between the two 
services continue to this day.30
The relative ease of interaction on the
military front was not matched elsewhere. In a
visit to Washington in March 1992, Indian 
Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit met with senior
defense official Paul Wolfowitz to “make an
assessment of how far the U.S. was interested
in defense cooperation” and found Wolfowitz
“fully supportive of new beginnings” between 
the two countries.31 The cordiality of this
meeting was in contrast to discussions with 
his counterparts in the State Department,
Office of the Trade Representative, and 
meetings with members of Congress and the 
press. Members of Congress, in particular, he
noted, “concentrated entirely on issues of non-
proliferation and Kashmir.” In his memoirs, 
Dixit makes a point of noting the frequency
with this non-proliferation would come up in
his meetings, forcing him to reiterate that 
“India was absolutely firm about not signing
the NPT.”32 It should be noted that my 
interviews with former State Department
officials downplayed the importance of the
military connection to improved U.S.-India
relations. However, I see military-military ties
as providing an important point of institu-
tional continuity during the turbulent decade
of the 1990s, offering a point of bilateral
contact which were independent of the 
traditional bugbears of the relationship, and 
thereby providing a common base from which 
new ties could be forged once the political 
climate changed.
These two themes, ongoing concerns 
about proliferation coupled with greater
strategic interaction, would continue on
parallel tracks through most of the decade.
Starting in the early 1990s, however, a new
factor would enter bilateral calculations—
commerce. The conventional wisdom is that,
following a severe balance of payments crisis 
in 1991, the public symbol of which was an 
emergency sale of gold reserves in order to 
meet its debt obligations, Indian economic 
planners adopted neo-liberal economic 
policies that have produced a transformation
in India’s economic performance.33 India’s lack 
of economic growth in the preceding four
decades, by extension, was the product of
decades of state planning, autarkic policies 
and lack of technological innovation. This
view is contested, 34 but regardless, since the 
early 1990s, India has had high rates of 
economic growth, and, if these trends
continue, is in the process of becoming a major
global economic force. This development has 
affected U.S. perceptions at the policy-making 
and elite levels considerably. Even though
India’s GNP is still relatively small in absolute
terms, this change in perception has been 
reinforced by the international success of
private Indian information technology and
software companies, making the city of
Bangalore, the hub of many of these 
companies, a widely recognized metonym for 
its new economic profile.
If rapid economic growth provided an
entirely new and positive backdrop against
which India’s image was slowly changing for
the better, and closer military-to-military ties
produced new U.S. supporters for improved
relations with India, including the possibility
of arms sales to a large and growing market,
familiar concerns still plagued U.S.-India 
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political relations in the 1990s, especially
nuclear weapons. At various points during the 
decade, India and Pakistan came close to
armed military conflict, confounding the
predictions of deterrence optimists who
expected that the presence of nuclear weapons 
on both sides would promote a more stable 
relationship.35 Fearing the outbreak of nuclear
war, the U.S. kept close watch on this region,
with government and non-governmental 
agencies and experts becoming a regular 
presence in the region seeking to promote 
conflict-prevention strategies and confidence-
building measures. In 1992, reflecting this
greater visibility, the State Department
reorganized its regional division of the world 
and created, for the first time, a South Asia
Bureau (now, Bureau for South and Central 
Asia) headed by an official with rank of 
assistant secretary. In December 1995, with
satellite images suggesting that India was
preparing to test nuclear weapons, U.S.
diplomats rushed to Delhi and “warned that a 
test would backfire against India.”36 Prime 
Minister P. V. Narashimha Rao backed down 
and India cancelled the tests.
Although former deputy secretary of
state Strobe Talbott reports that President
Clinton came into office seeking to improve
ties with India, for the first six years, very little
actually happened. Talbott writes, “India’s 
refusal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty… made it hard for the Clinton
Administration to develop traction with
India.”37 From the Indian standpoint, if 
anything, the U.S. had increased its pressure 
to join the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
and close down its nuclear option. Leading up 
to a Washington visit by Indian Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao, the U.S. pressured 
India to join multi-party talks on putting curbs 
on their nuclear and ballistic missile 
programs. To the surprise of few, Indian
diplomats dug in their heels and the talks 
failed. But even as little progress was made on
the proliferation front, 1995 also saw visits to
India by senior U.S. cabinet officials, the 
secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and 
Commerce, and First Lady Hillary Clinton.
With the end of the Cold War, and the 
new mantra of economic globalization
sweeping the world, non-nuclear states had 
become more forthright in asserting their view 
that nuclear weapons were increasingly an 
aberration in international politics. In the
prelude leading up to the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT), international public
opinion showed how powerful and widely 
held these views were, when France and 
China were condemned across the world for 
conducting a final round of nuclear tests 
before agreeing to sign the test ban treaty. In 
1996, the World Court, responding to a
request from the U.N. General Assembly, 
issued a remarkable advisory opinion (albeit a
split decision) that while it could not declare 
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
illegal, the “threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would generally be contrary to the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict,
and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law.”38 Ironically, India had 
submitted a brief to the Court supporting this
judgment. As the Canberra Commission on 
the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons—an 
independent commission of experts set up by 
the Australian government—noted, pres-
ciently, as it would turn out: “The end of the
Cold War has created a new climate for
international action to eliminate nuclear 
weapons, a new opportunity. It must be
exploited quickly or it will be lost.”39
At the multilateral level, both the 25-year
review conference of the NPT in 1995, and
lengthy negotiations over the CTBT that began
in 1994, became settings for the familiar stand
off between India and the U.S. on the nuclear 
issue. Although India was not an official
participant in the NPT talks, it watched the
development of the negotiations closely.
When the review conference surprisingly
decided to renew the treaty indefinitely while
increasing pressure on the nuclear weapons
states to take Article VI (their commitment to 
work towards arms reduction and 
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disarmament) far more seriously than in the
past, Indian policy makers took careful note.40
At the CTBT talks, the Indian sense of
beleaguered isolation from the international
mainstream increased. Although India had
been one of the first countries to propose a 
comprehensive test ban, as early as the 1950s, 
it ended up vetoing the treaty at the
Conference on Disarmament. Holding fast to
its position that the treaty should also include
a time-bound commitment for nuclear
weapons states to begin disarmament talks,
India found itself in a distinct minority. The
CTBT employed an unusual provision that 
had the effect of singling out India and a few 
other states by insisting that all nuclear-
capable countries should sign and ratify the
treaty for it to come into force. This provision,
outlined in Article XIV and pushed by Britain,
Russia and China, who may have been
seeking to weaken the treaty for their own
strategic reasons, sought to tie India to the 
terms of the treaty even though it remained
outside its framework. All this worked to
strengthen the hands of domestic nuclear
hardliners arguing that India should now 
declare itself a nuclear weapons state. As even 
critics Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik noted
at the time, “what, after all, is the point of
India not signing the CTBT but then
remaining where it would have been if it had
signed?… There is more internal pressure than
ever before to carry out tests… [even though]
there has been no qualitative shift in Chinese 
and Pakistani nuclear behavior.” 41
The 1998 Tests
In May 1998, following a number of rapid
transfers of political power, the new Indian
government led by a Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) coalition carried out their election
manifesto pledge and declared India a nuclear
weapons state after conducting five nuclear
tests. In spite of intense U.S. pressure and
inducements,42 Pakistan soon followed suit,
making South Asia the only region of the 
world where two declared nuclear weapons 
states confronted each other. The extent of
Indian elite exuberance at this declaration of 
nuclear might was directly proportionate to 
international anger at this development,
coupled with intense U.S. embarrassment at 
being so caught by surprise. “We’re going to
come down on these guys like a ton of bricks,”
President Clinton reportedly said, even as “the
machinery of government cranked out an
array of sanctions against India that reflected
the requirements of the law and the intensity
of the president’s feelings.”43 The disapproval
of the U.S. was soon joined by the major 
powers, individually and via U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1172. China, which had 
initially remained silent, added its voice to the
fray when a letter from Indian Prime Minister 
Vajpayee to President Clinton, naming China 
as India’s main threat, was leaked to the press.
Considering the initial flurry of anger, 
coming a few short years after the world 
seemed poised on the brink of bringing the 
period of dominance of nuclear weapons to a
close, it is remarkable how quickly interna-
tional anger died down, and how soon the
world came to terms with two new nuclear
weapons states.44 This is not to say there were 
no anxieties at all; after all, within a year of
these tests India and Pakistan had gone to war
with each other across the line of control in 
Kargil, leading also to the fall of the last
civilian elected government in Pakistan.45 But 
the prevailing feeling appeared to be that this
development was now a fait accompli, and the 
world had to accept that these two countries
were not going to give up their nuclear 
weapons. Considerable credit for this
turnaround must be give to some adroit
Indian diplomacy, led by BJP Foreign Minister 
Jaswant Singh, who, within months of the
tests, was in Washington explaining India’s
case to the Clinton Administration.
The Jaswant Singh visit would augur a 
new opening in India-U.S. relations,
epitomized by eight rounds of discussions
between Jaswant Singh and President 
Clinton’s designee, Strobe Talbott, on the 
condition of and possibilities for better
relations between the two countries. While no
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practical breakthrough emerged as a result of
these talks, their impact was felt in important
symbolic terms for both sides. For India, the 
talks helped assuage Indian anxieties about
their place in the world by signaling that it
was a worthy bilateral interlocutor for the sole 
superpower. For the United States, the talks
helped establish, in Washington, the “common
sense” of the idea that India was an important
country that had for too long been left outside
the U.S. orbit, and that its leaders were
trustworthy and could be relied upon. The
talks helped set a baseline for interaction
between the two states, helped clarify some of
the differences in the positions held by both 
states, and created considerable goodwill 
which would become a resource for the future.
That India’s gamble to test nuclear weapons
had paid off was confirmed when, in spite of
his initial angry reaction, President Clinton
visited India in 2000, in a visit that was widely 
touted as being path-breaking.
The decision to declare India a nuclear
weapons state, the nuclear tests and their 
aftermath, have, in Indian elite perspective,
emerged as the strategic complement to the
transformation of its economic model. It
would lead one commentator to say: “Fifty
years after independence, India now wanted
to become a normal nation—placing consi-
derations of realpolitik and national security
above its recently dominant focus on liberal
internationalism, morality and normative
approaches to international politics.”46 To the 
extent that liberal internationalism, morality
and norms are weapons of the weak, and
taken together indicate a desire to alter the 
rule of international power, “normalcy” for 
India hence implies becoming a status-quo 
power.
The Transformation of Relations 
The first public hint of the Bush 
Administration’s thinking about India was
flagged in an essay by presidential advisor
Condoleeza Rice in Foreign Affairs in January 
2000. She wrote, in an article that lays out
most of the themes that would soon come to 
mark the Bush Administration’s foreign policy
practice, including concerns about declining
defense spending, excessive multilateralism,
Kyoto, “rogue regimes” like Iraq and Iran,
and, especially, U.S. relations with great
powers Russia and China:
China is still a potential threat to stability in
the Asia-Pacific region… [It] would like to 
alter Asia’s balance of power in its own
favor… China’s success in controlling the
balance of power depends in large part on
America’s reaction to the challenge. The 
United States must deepen its cooperation
with Japan and South Korea and maintain its 
commitment to a robust military presence in 
the region. It should pay close attention to 
India’s role in the regional balance. There is a
strong tendency conceptually to connect 
India with Pakistan and to think only of
Kashmir or the nuclear competition between
the two states. But India is an element in
China’s calculation, and it should be in
America’s too. India is not a great power yet,
but it has the potential to emerge as one… It 
is important to promote China’s internal 
transition through economic interaction while 
containing Chinese power and security
ambitions. Cooperation should be pursued,
but we should never be afraid to confront
Beijing when our interests collide.47
This forthright statement about China’s
aggressive grand strategy, and its response 
that confrontation with this “strategic
competitor” should not be considered off 
limits, stood in marked contrast to the
ameliorative Clinton approach, as well to the
approach taken by George Bush senior (1988–
1992) to China. It outlined a strategy that
stressed a geo-political understanding of the
Asia-Pacific region, not surprising for a
foreign policy team that had won their spurs 
during the Cold War, and that required 
“containing Chinese power and security 
ambitions.”48 Seen in that light, states 
bordering China, including Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and India, had a special role to
play in assisting China’s containment. India, 
in addition, was seen as a country that had the
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potential to emerge as a great power. Its 
nuclear program and its unsettled relationship 
with Pakistan were being marginalized in 
favor of its potential within a new American
containment plan. This was music to New 
Delhi’s ears.
Secretary of State Powell, in his
confirmation hearings, reiterated India’s new 
visibility. After wondering aloud whether it
was time to remove sanctions against India, he 
noted that India was to be a high priority for
this administration. In early 2001, when 
Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited 
Washington to meet his new counterpart and
National Security Advisor Rice, President
Bush “unexpectedly” dropped in to
demonstrate his personal interest in better 
relations with India. U.S. actions were quickly
responded to by India. When the U.S.
announced its interest in abrogating the long-
standing Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and
developing theater missile defense systems, 
India was among the first (and few) countries
to welcome the move. This quick reaction
would lead to further high-level consultations,
with Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage being sent to Delhi in May 2001 to
discuss the new U.S. strategic framework with 
the Indian government. These fast moving 
developments were brought to a sudden halt
in September 2001, with the attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon. Suddenly 
Pakistan was back on center-stage, and South
Asia had become a major front in a new war,
this time on global terrorism.
Although India was tactically sidelined in 
relation to Pakistan once the war on terror
began, it had the unintended consequence of
elevating the issue of terrorism to prominence
at the highest levels of U.S. decision-making.
India has long been a victim of terror attacks 
from radical groups, notably Islamic 
extremists based in Pakistan. Although this
complaint has been a constant theme in Indian 
remonstrations to the U.S. about the latter’s
support of Pakistan, after September 2001 
these concerns obviously resonated in new 
and important ways. Soon after the Afghan-
istan campaign began, terrorist attacks took
place in Indian Kashmir in October, and, in a 
shocking breakdown of security, within the
precincts of India’s parliament complex in 
December 2001. India put its armed forces on 
high alert, and for the next ten months, Indian
and Pakistani armies faced each other “eyeball
to eyeball” across the international border. 
The threat of imminent war led to the closure
of foreign embassies and the withdrawal of
most diplomatic staff. High-level British and
U.S. mediators regularly shuttled between 
Islamabad and New Delhi, hoping to avert a
full-scale war, which they feared, could lead to
a nuclear exchange. In October 2002, India
stood down its forces, and the crisis ended.49
There remains a dispute about the 
imminence of the crisis and the actual 
likelihood of war, but what was confirmed in 
U.S. eyes was the possibility of a terrorist
attack becoming a trigger for escalation to all-
out conflict. India’s position as a victim of
radical Islamic terror worked to reinforce its 
position as a natural ally of the U.S., a country 
faced with the same problems if on a different
geographic scale. In a speech given to the 
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in 
New Delhi in January 2003, U.S. ambassador
to New Delhi, Robert Blackwill would identify
the common issues facing the two countries as
the following: “to promote peace and freedom 
in Asia, combat international terrorism, and 
slow the spread of weapons of mass
destruction.”50 Remarkably missing is any
reference to non-proliferation.
Ambassador Blackwill would become a
key player in the transformation of U.S.-India
relations. A former Harvard professor and 
European specialist in the National Security
Council, during his two years in Delhi 
Blackwill was instrumental in the establishing
a new understanding of India in U.S. eyes and
the implementation of a new framework for
India-U.S. relations. He had been sent to Delhi 
with a firm mandate from President Bush to 
transform relations with India. Other 
ambassadors may also have received this 
charge, but Blackwill was able to do far more
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than his predecessors. Working at the policy 
level between Washington and New Delhi,
Blackwill’s efforts were also made possible by
the practical support offered by his senior
advisor, former Rand Corporation and 
currently Carnegie Endowment senior fellow,
and expert in nuclear issues and Asian 
strategic affairs, Ashley J. Tellis. Tellis and
Blackwill, operating with a thorough and 
nuanced understanding of policy-making and 
politics in both capitals, became a formidable
duo. They began at once to work on the trust 
deficit in Delhi.  As Tellis recalls:
During 2001-3, when the bilateral relationship 
was at its most intense, the strategic dialogue
possessed an intimacy that was displayed in 
the willingness of both sides to engage in
genuinely freewheeling conversation rather 
than scripted recitation of talking points. 
Success during this period was enhanced 
by… Blackwill’s insistence that the U.S.
government routinely brief senior officials in
New Delhi on major American policy
initiatives completely unrelated to bilateral
relations… [This had the effect of] 
underscoring the conviction that the United 
States mattered to the United States not just 
within South Asian but on a global scale.51
Blackwill would also introduce
organizational changes in the U.S. Embassy in
Delhi, creating a system that led to close 
relationships between embassy staff and a
variety of Indian government officials, few of 
whom had had any connections with U.S. 
officials before. As a result, new stakeholders 
in a close relationship were forged, reducing
the number of possible “blocking coalitions”
within the Indian government.52 These 
relationships did not lead to complete
agreement between the two sides, but 
disagreements were far more transparent than
before, leading to a new sense of confidence 
and increasing the level of trust in U.S. bona
fides. Working to change attitudes in
Washington was, Tellis recalls, more difficult
in many respects. Problems to overcome 
included legal constraints on closer ties 
between the two countries as well as negative
perceptions widely held among the civil 
bureaucracy of India as a Soviet client and as 
an obstructionist member of the non-aligned 
movement. Apart from being a seasoned
bureaucratic infighter, Blackwill had one great
asset he was not unwilling to use in his
struggle to define the mission of 
transformation: direct access to the president.
The successes of these efforts led to the
first breakthrough in the relationship. In early
2004, the two governments announced the
Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), a 
wide-ranging initiative focusing on Indian 
access to once-restricted high technologies:
space, nuclear energy, dual-use high 
technology trade and missile defense.53 Its 
intent, according to the Indian government is
to “expand engagement,” “enhance coopera-
tion,” and is a “step to create the appropriate
environment”54—a series of cautious steps
towards better relations, especially in strategic
and defense industries. Most of the NSSP
discussions were about removing Indian
entities from a sanctions list, and easing the
way for Indian purchases of defense-related
technologies. Tellis, in an important report
published just before the breakthrough
agreement of July 2005, argued that while the
NSSP was a “political advance, it nonetheless
remains a precarious breakthrough from the 
point of radically reforming U.S.-India
relations.”55 He saw little sign in the
agreement that there were means likely to 
overcome existing bureaucratic resistance, and 
called for the President to issue an 
unambiguous statement, through the means of
a National Security Decision Directive, to meet
the stated objective of making India a great 
power. The report went on to propose new
high-level dialogues on energy security,
strategic cooperation, and economic
engagement.
Clearly, people in high places absorbed 
the arguments of Tellis’ report: there is no
better indication of that than reading the July
2005 India-U.S. agreement. The announcement
is built around his most ambitious recommen-
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dations, especially on nuclear energy. As he 
proposed, the U.S. decided to sideline its non-
proliferation concerns in favor of helping
India to meet its energy needs, and agreed to
create a legal exception for India. For the U.S.
this would have the benefit of “[increasing
India’s] enthusiasm for contributing towards
counter-proliferation activities in the Indian
Ocean, buttress its potential utility as a hedge 
against a rising China, encourage it to pursue
economic and strategic policies aligned with
U.S. interests, and shape its choices in regard 
to global energy stability and environmental
protect-tion.” As mentioned earlier, the July
2005 joint statement would be followed by the
March 2006 agreement, which would commit
the U.S. and India to making radical changes 
in their relationship, foregrounding the once-
most contentious issue, civilian nuclear
relations. In a few short years, U.S.-India
relations had been turned around, with
nuclear energy no longer an issue of dispute, 
but one of possibility. Non-proliferation
concerns had been sidelined, replaced by 
India as a strategic partner of the United
States, producing a new geopolitical map of 
Asia. In this scheme, putting constraints on
India’s ability to acquire and project military
power was no longer in U.S. interests; hence, 
that fissile material could be diverted to 
India’s military program was no longer a
problem, indeed it was required if India was to 
fulfill this new role. 
Making Sense of the Transformation 
Why now? Given that there had been a 
number of moments in the past when India-
U.S. relations could have improved, what was 
different about the present that made possible
this turnaround? From the U.S. point of view,
and in the absence of other mediating factors,
relations with India have been trapped
between two opposing forces. Typically, one is
usually glossed as regional in scope, the other 
derives from universal policy concerns. 
Regionalists, largely but not only from the 
State Department, favored a democratic,
economically vibrant, and militarily strong
India over Pakistan as the most obvious choice 
for U.S. long term interests in the region.
Functionalists, drawn from across a range of
government agencies, and concerned with
global areas of concern like proliferation or
terrorism, came to the opposite conclusion.
South Asia was an area of grave concern
because of this region’s outlier status in the
global nuclearscape. Hence, these two forces—
or rather their advocates—were usually in
constant bureaucratic competition with each
other, leading Strobe Talbott to describe the
outcome as “losers coming back to fight 
another day—or in compromises that left no
one entirely satisfied”—the functionalist-
dominated disequilibrium that had prevailed 
since 1974.56
This study argues that transformation has 
come about due to a conjuncture of
independent actions and outcomes at multiple
levels—at the structural, bureaucratic, and 
conceptual levels. As described below, all three
contributed in different ways to the current
state of U.S.-India relations.
The early 1990s onward were marked by
the convergence of two structural factors
working in favor of better relations. The first
was the product of a changing geo-political
strategy: due to China’s emergence as a long 
term “strategic rival” to the United States,
India’s growing military muscle and regional 
dominance made it more attractive to the U.S. 
in its search for allies and partners to balance 
China. India, in this case, took the place of
Pakistan as the regional partner in the familiar
pattern of U.S.-South Asia relations. By the 
same token, this brought the Defense
Department, a new and powerful bureaucratic
actor, into a setting usually dominated by
State. Defense Department support for better 
relations with India had the effect of
broadening the debate, and helped offset the 
influence of functional agencies concerned
with Indian non-proliferation, trade barriers, 
and restrictions on foreign business. 
Independent of this shift in strategy, but
acting in its support, was the Bush Admin-
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istration’s indifference to and even hostility to
long-established multilateral treaties and
agreements. While it would not be correct to 
call this a structural factor in the
transformation of relations, this willingness to
not be tied down by past agreements certainly 
made it easier to consider jettisoning legally 
constraining strictures emanating from the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty and comple-
mentary domestic legislation. This factor lies 
between the structural and the political levels:
any action by a superpower is inevitably
structural in its effects, yet this tendency also 
weighs heavily on domestic politics.
The second structural factor, which is still
being played out, is entirely new in the history
of U.S.-India relations. There is now an
independent reason for India to be taken
seriously, namely, the rate of India’s economic
growth for the last fifteen years. Although
India’s GNP is still relatively small in absolute
terms, India’s fast pace of growth, taking place 
in an institutional setting which is less
politically risky than China, makes it an
important and attractive site for U.S. overseas
investment, and increases by many times the 
stakeholders interested in maintaining closer
ties between the two countries. India’s
economic globalization, in other words, is the
new structural factor helping transform 
relations between the two countries. This
condition is what makes possible the further
transformation of India-U.S. relations by 
bringing the power of U.S. business lobbies
into the debate on the side of better relations
with India. For the first time, the United States
has an interest in better ties with India without
the mediation of a global struggle or a local crisis,
as has always been the case in the past. Even 
without the China factor, the possibility of 
major economic interests in India transforms
the profile of the country for the U.S. 
At the bureaucratic level lay the combined 
forces of Ambassador Blackwill, Ashley Tellis, 
and their allies in the U.S. government,
seeking not simply to “improve” U.S. relations
with India, but to transform it qualitatively.
Their desire for transformation was not 
merely an objective, but also a calculated
means to get beyond the usual bureaucratic
hurdles and inertia. After all there have been
prior moments—notably the Kennedy years—
during which relations with India could have
changed, but didn’t. Recognizing that there 
existed numerous bureaucratic spoilers and 
legal constraints that would kick in once a
certain level of improved relations had been 
achieved, thereby permanently consigning the 
state of India-U.S. relations to incremental 
improvement, they understood that a
transformed relationship with India would
only be possible if it were taken out of the 
usual groove of everyday foreign policy. India 
needed to become a matter of the U.S. national
interest; nothing less would overcome
statutory constraints on better ties with India,
and enable the U.S. to meet Indian concerns 
more completely. While the Bush
Administration had rhetorically committed to 
a warm relationship with India, that
commitment needed to be made manifest and 
“actionable.” This required decisions taken at
the highest level of the government, at the 
White House. Blackwill, in particular, had that
access, and used it effectively to make the case 
that a new India-U.S. relationship was of the
utmost importance to the United States. In 
short, the need to overcome the many 
restraints on better relations required a radical 
step that set the relationship outside the norm, 
and established India as an exceptional case.
This was a risky step: to transform relations
with India would involve nothing less than
taking on one of the core planks of U.S.
foreign policy since the 1970s: non-
proliferation. Yet, if change beyond the
incremental was to happen, there was no
other way. The decision to go ahead with this
charged political step was taken at the highest
level, where India’s democratic credentials
proved to be the most important factor
justifying this sea change.57
     Getting the attention of the White
House was necessary to overcome U.S.
bureaucratic resistance but not sufficient to
change bilateral relations.  What needed to be
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changed as well was New Delhi’s attitude
towards Washington, and overcoming its long 
list of historical and immediate grievances. As 
we have seen from the discussion, from the 
Indian point of view, there is good reason for
a considerable deficit of trust vis-à-vis the 
United States. Getting Indian elites to believe 
that this time would be different would not be 
easy, unless the U.S. truly made India an offer 
“it could not refuse.” And what better offer
could there be than the very issue that had
bedeviled bilateral relations since 1974? The
high stakes gamble taken by the bureaucratic 
advocates of transformed U.S.-India relations
argued that the greatest problem in bilateral
relations needed to become its greatest asset. 
India has articulated a very distinct set of
demands in its expression of closer ties with 
the United States. These benefits are 
highlighted in the so-called “trinity” of issues 
that characterized the NSSP—civilian nuclear 
power, dual-use high technology, and space
cooperation—later expanded to a “quartet” 
when missile defense was added.58 This 
cluster of issues stands out for its association
with high and rare technologies that are likely
to have strategic applications. In other words,
India defined better relations with the United
States in the very issue-area where the
likelihood of real progress was least likely.
This was due to very natural U.S. concerns 
that release of these technologies would have
the effect of altering the regional balance of 
power in the short term and reducing the 
relative preponderance of U.S. power in the 
long run. As Alan Krondstadt has pointed out,
the list of restricted technologies encompasses 
less than 1% of total U.S.-India trade; yet—
from the Indian point of view—this tiny
margin was important enough to hold hostage
improved U.S.-India relations. In what
appeared to be a classic Catch-22 situation,
U.S. denial of potentially strategic high
technology was always pointed to as giving 
the lie to its claims of desiring better relations
with India.
As I have argued elsewhere, technology
has long been associated in elite Indian 
political culture with the highest levels of
modernity and development. 59 For a variety of 
historical reasons, the condition of Indian 
development came to be defined in terms of 
the technological capacity of the country. To
very briefly summarize a long argument, this
is because the lack of modern technology was
seen retrospectively by nationalist leaders like
Jawaharlal Nehru as the principal reason why
it was possible for India to be so easily 
colonized. Hence, following political indepen-
dence, Indian technological development had
to be as advanced as anywhere in the world 
for that shameful historical condition never to 
be repeated.60 Atomic energy was, at the
moment of independence, enshrined as the
highest form of modern technology, giving it a 
privileged place in the pantheon of Indian
modernity to this day, despite its many
practical failures. Over time, this obsession 
with technology has crystallized into a desire 
for Indian membership in certain exclusive
high tech “clubs”—especially space and
rocketry, and, nuclear energy and advanced 
military weapons. Hence, U.S. relations with
India could be held hostage to 1% of the items
being traded between them, not merely
because of their material and strategic
importance, but because of the symbolic
meaning and historical context attached to
Indian acquisition of high and rare 
technologies.
Bureaucratic warriors had to face a 
different kind of challenge to meet these
particular demands from India. American
willingness to give in to Indian demands for
strategic high technology required that
policymakers unanimously agreed that India
would never become a strategic competitor to
the U.S. Just as no one in the U.S. could 
imagine Great Britain using its nuclear
weapons to attack Washington, so also a
fundamental change in perception had to
come about which would make the likelihood 
of Indian strategic conflict with the U.S.
beyond the pale, whether materially possible
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or not. While this possibility may seem
extremely remote at the present time, strategic 
analysis requires thinking long into the future.
Accepting India as a non-enemy was made
possible by putting the U.S. in India’s shoes, 
and realizing that China would always be a
more proximate and likely competitor to
India, long before Indian power reached the 
capacity seriously to threaten the United
States. Given that outcome, Indian and U.S.
threat perceptions would naturally coincide,
even in the absence of formal treaty alliances, 
making the decision to support Indian
strategic technology desires sensible in 
relation to a greater and more likely threat.
Ambassador Blackwill indicated this line
of argument in comments to a journalist 
roundtable at the Council for Foreign
Relations, when he noted: “However, I believe 
that if this relationship continues on its
current direction of transformation, and if in 
10 or 15 years—or sooner, but 10 or 15 years—
China begins to act aggressively externally
and in a hostile way, these two countries will
come together naturally. So they do not have
to plan for it; they’ll come together naturally…
because they are natural allies with a little
‘a.’”61 By this logic, allowing India to become a 
military power is a necessary and desirable
outcome of the new state of relations between 
the two countries, not a consequence of poor 
negotiating skills or Indian intransigence.
Underlying this transformation is an
ongoing “relocation” of India in cultural-
representational terms. American perceptions 
of India were long dominated by journalist 
Katherine Mayo’s 1927 screed Mother India,
which painted a sensational and horrific 
picture of Oriental degeneracy, and concluded 
that political independence for India was far
too dangerous to contemplate. Although 
Mohandas Gandhi described Mother India as 
little more than a “Drain Inspector’s Report,”
its immense popularity continued to shape 
impressions of India around the world, long 
after the book was published.62 The contrast 
with Pearl S. Buck and her sympathetic
writings on rural China in the shaping of
American attitudes towards that country is
striking. Even though the experiences of U.S.
servicemen during World War II, and the 
Indian pilgrimages of civil rights leaders 
offered other images and memories of the
country,63 the idea of India as a place of great
extremes—social inequalities, weather,
language, and geography—proved hard to 
displace. During the 1960s, Lyndon Johnson’s
obsessions with the failures of Indian
agriculture did much to reinforce the 
dominant Mayo-derived view. Whatever one’s
views of it, India did not seem like anywhere 
else, its uniqueness making it difficult for easy 
comparative reference, both a boon and a 
drawback.
In 1993, the long disused idea of a 
“civilization” as the ahistorical marker of the
essence of a society’s norms and behavior was
brought into public prominence by Samuel
Huntington in his controversial Foreign Policy
article on the “clash” of civilizations,
developed later into a book length treatment
(1996). This influential, if deeply flawed 
argument, would identify India as represent-
tative of “Hindu civilization,” alongside
Western, Islamic and Confucian civilizations.
Most visible in Strobe Talbott’s dialogues with
Jaswant Singh after the nuclear tests of 1998 
and continuing on during Ambassador
Blackwill’s tenure in New Delhi, India began
to establish its identity in U.S. eyes in new 
ways—notably as a distinct civilizational entity
and, hence, as an Asian power.
It is noteworthy that Talbott’s discussions
with Singh would spend so much time
interpreting the past. A deep anxiety about
history and the past, and, for related reasons, 
the assertion of modern India as the
contemporary legatee of Hindu civilization,
has been the hallmark of the intervention in
Indian politics represented by Singh’s political
party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), since 
its re-emergence in the late 1980s. Jaswant
Singh was an able articulator of those themes,
as is expressly indicated in the Talbott memoir
and Singh’s own writings on international
politics and defense.64 Talbott was by no 
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means a naïve interlocutor in this regard; he 
had done his homework and was well able to 
separate the more virulent and bigoted 
commentary he heard from what he 
considered a reasonable recounting of Indian 
national identity. Nonetheless, he was not 
averse to taking a civilizational discourse 
seriously as a way of understanding that
identity. Talbott reiterates this, when, in the 
early pages of his memoir, before he begins 
the account of his dialogues, he compares
India and the United States, both former
British colonies: “[Unlike Americans] Indians
were of a different race and culture. They 
were bearers of a great and ancient civilization
who had been treated, in Rudyard Kipling’s
famous phrase, as a burden to be borne by the 
white man.” This statement in particular helps
us see the effect of Jaswant Singh’s arguments 
on Talbott who now understands Indian 
identity as the combination of great
antiquity—requiring due respect, and recent
domination—requiring due sensitivity.
The “cultural” discourse on India that
emerges from the Talbott and Singh dialogues, 
and that continues today, is dominated by two 
related themes. Both themes are drawn from a 
worldview that highlights contemporary India 
as first, the political inheritor of an ancient
Hindu cultural civilization; and second, as a 
proud post-colonial society, intensely jealous
of its national sovereignty and anxious always
to ensure that it is never subject to “neo-
colonial” slights, whether intentional or not. 
This theme plays on the U.S.’s own 
sensitivities about racism and cultural
domination; it also requires the U.S. to live up
to its standing as the world’s first independent
postcolonial state.
India as an ancient civilization is a trope
particularly attractive to American sensi-
bilities, especially by way of contrast with the
U.S. as a very new and recent arrival on the
world stage. Notwithstanding today’s
overwhelming power and prestige, culturally
sensitive Americans are fond of reminding
themselves of the antiquity of the rest of the 
world, reinforcing by default the novelty of
the U.S. experience. For instance, speaking
before his departure, Ambassador Blackwill
would wax eloquent to a group of Indian 
businessmen: “standing in Jaisamler, close
your eyes for a moment and see the camel 
caravan coming through this desert town a 
thousand years ago, which I now realize by 
India’s civilizational standards is only 
yesterday.” The speech goes on to sketch a
map of India in geographic, religious, and 
cultural terms—“Uttar Pradesh and 
Uttaranchal—the heat, the dust, and the 
glacial source of the Ganga… Ladakh’s high 
plateau with Buddhist prayer flags flapping…
a harmonium in the Golden Temple… Jain 
Dilwara temples in Mount Abu … Pulsating 
Mumbai … Ancient Christianity in Kerala…
the blend of Hindu and Islamic architecture in
Chennai… the flowers and forests of Sikkim… 
the Northeast, Kaziranga and the Brahma-
putra”65—that in the end seeks to produce a 
unified geo-cultural reading of India. This 
familiar technique of exposition, drawn upon 
for instance by Rabindranath Tagore in 
composing India’s national anthem, ends by
the apparently contradictory assertion of a
unified Indian essence in spite of this rich 
diversity. In other words, notwithstanding
these diverse images, they represent one entity 
because there is something more fundamental 
underlying them—that unifying essence is 
India, not the nation-state, but as a geo-
cultural bloc—a civilization. The discursive
slide from “in spite of” [diversity] into
“because of” [diversity] is the move that
makes this form of narration a civilizational
discourse. It takes unity at the level of a 
civilization to condense the incredible 
diversity described into a common factor, the 
master trope called “India.” The BJP must be
given the credit for reiterating, at every turn, 
India-as-civilization rather than “just” another
nation-state. The evidence suggests that this
idea has now traveled to become a familiar 
and powerful theme in official U.S. 
representations of India.
This way of thinking is reinforced by one 
section of the Indian diaspora in the United 
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States, who have long been searching for a
way of situating India in the American
cultural imaginary in terms reflecting their
self-image as upper caste and upper class
Hindus. Efforts in this direction have been 
questioned and contested by others in the 
diaspora, but the major site of contestation is
significant. A concerted effort has been made
to alter the description of India in secondary
school textbooks, not only to remove negative
and culturally false stereotypes of Indian pasts
and presents, but also to inscribe officially a 
particular and narrow perspective of pre-
modern and classical Indian society. Their 
desire is to conflate India with Hindu, and to 
promote the idea of Indic cultures as above all 
a Hindu civilization, a higher order than just
another nation-state, and aspiring to be on the
same scale as the (equally specious) notion of 
a unified “Western” civilization.
The effect of this representational change 
has been to allow India to become, culturally,
an Asian power in U.S. eyes. “Asia” in the
American imaginary traditionally refers only
to Northeast Asia—China, Japan, and Korea, 
in the first instance, followed at some distance
by Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, and
other ASEAN countries. U.S. cultural,
geopolitical and organizational thinking had 
always treated South Asia as external to the 
Asia-Pacific region. South Asia had long been,
as shown above, a periphery for the United 
States, lacking the inherent material or 
strategic considerations to warrant inde-
pendent attention in the absence of external
sources of change. For most of the last fifty 
years, South Asia fell between this region and
the U.S.’s other great geopolitical interest, the 
Middle East, and without independent
reasons for attention, ended up being 
marginal to both. Nuclear weapons
development and India’s growing economic 
might changed that calculus from a material
point of view, but these dialogues and new 
representations complemented those changes 
by helping change India’s perception in U.S.
eyes from a cultural point of view.
The net effect of these conceptual shifts is 
to “relocate” India in important ways.
Reiterating India’s cultural antiquity helps 
establish a regional connection with Japan and
China in their familiar construction as 
emblematic Asian civilizations. India becomes 
Asian because it is now seen to possess the
same historical and cultural characteristics of
those states. While it might reasonably be 
proposed that India needed to “rise” to the 
level of a civilization before it could be seen as
worthy of sustained U.S. attention, what is
more to the point is the need to situate India in
Asia before the logic of geopolitics can take
hold. No longer reduced to its poverty,
inequalities of sexuality, wealth, opportunity
and other familiar tropes of Mother India,
contemporary India as the economically
vibrant, culturally self-confident, geopolitical
and strategic inheritor of an ancient Asian
civilization is a very different, and far more 
worthy, interlocutor for the United States.
Conclusions
The big question for the future is obviously 
the sustainability of the transformation in 
India-U.S. relations now underway. The 
analysis in this study began from the premise
that both India and the United States sought
improvement in bilateral relations from the
end of the Cold War. The primary obstacles in 
the way of a qualitative increase in better
relations were U.S. statutory constraints
related to India’s nuclear status and Indian
distrust of U.S. bona fides based on prior 
experience and historical conditioning. Hence,
although eager to improve bilateral relations,
India could do relatively little to influence this
desirable outcome. The vector of change had 
to come from the U.S. side. This study argued 
that such change has come about due to a 
conjuncture of forces operating at three levels,
the structural, the bureaucratic-political, and 
the conceptual.
If these arguments are correct, the 
conditions determining the sustainability of
this relationship are linked to these three key 
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forces. The least likely of these factors to revert 
to the status quo ante are the major conceptual
shifts described above, i.e. India as an Asian 
civilization, and the new geopolitics of the
Asia-Pacific, following the rise of China. 
Given the length of time it takes to alter these 
conceptual parameters, neither of these factors
is likely to change significantly in the future,
even as new governments come to power in 
Washington and New Delhi. The other
structural factor, the rise of India as an
economic power, also seems quite likely to
continue to reinforce this relationship into the
medium term, even if India’s much-vaunted 
software industry softens, especially as the
Indian manufacturing sector increasingly
reaches global standards and Indian 
multinational companies continue to expand
overseas. As noted above, this factor is 
significant because it offers the only reason for 
the U.S. to have a stake in India without the
mediation of global or regional crises. On
balance, Indian economic growth as a factor 
facilitating the new relationship between the
two countries is, while perhaps not as fixed as 
the two variables identified above, a strong
force in its favor.
The site most prone to change in the near 
future is the political-bureaucratic level. While 
the discussion above dealt much more with
political maneuvers within the executive 
branch, the site of struggle has now shifted to 
the legislative. At the time of this writing, the
U.S. Congress is in the last few days of a short 
session, before returning home to prepare for 
the November 2006 midterm elections. If the
India-U.S. agreement does not pass in this fall
session, the Administration will have lost a lot
of invested political capital and wasted a great
deal of time as they will have to start this
process again, from scratch, in 2007. 
Moreover, there are numerous projections that 
the Republicans may lose their majority in at
least one of the two houses of Congress. If this
happens, the Administration may have 
difficulties getting this legislation through
Congress, not only because of political
weakness, but also because the Democrats 
may use this opportunity to punish the Bush
White House. Furthermore, any delay will
give new energy to civil society advocates of a
strong policy against nuclear proliferation.
Even if a new Congress eventually passes
legislation affirming the new relationship with
India, the Indian government has sent 
repeated warnings that it will not countenance
any change in the terms already agreed upon
by Prime Minister Singh and President Bush.66
The current Republican-majority Congress 
was not able to resist the temptation to include
caveats in the legislation that will have the
effect of applying conditions on India it is
loath to accept. A divided Congress is even 
more likely to impose conditions related to
proliferation fears as a way of assuaging the
lingering doubts of members who have
nevertheless accepted the merits of the 
strategic argument in favor of better India-U.S. 
ties. This will lead to major disagreements
with the White House, and with India. It has
been remarked that this agreement with India
stands as one of the Bush Administration’s 
few foreign policy successes, hence they are 
likely to fight extremely hard to ensure that
legislation passes without conditions. This will 
also be the moment when the alleged political
strength of the Indian Diaspora in the United
States will be put to the test.
A breakdown in the legislative process
will be serious, but not fatal to a closer 
relationship between both countries. Common
military and commercial interests, the former
driven by executive decisions in both 
countries, the latter mostly lying outside the
control of government, will be little affected.
The single greatest beneficiary of this new 
relationship, the Indian nuclear complex, will
be left high and dry. Neither able to produce 
more electricity for civilian consumers nor
able to become a dedicated weapons complex, 
it is likely to go into a major internal crisis. 
The greatest negative effect overall will be on 
Indian elite perceptions of the United States as 
a trusted partner. The ruling Congress party
will take the most heat for this debacle, but it
is unlikely to cause a serious breakdown of 
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political power or affect the next elections.
Those among the Indian political elite (both
left and right) who were already skeptical of 
the U.S. will seize upon this failure as further
proof of their doubts and will seek to block
Indian involvement in and support for
unilateral U.S. policies such as the
Proliferation Security Initiative or some 
aspects of the war on terror. As a result, the
United States will be forced into a public
position of being seen to be wooing India in
order to manage these domestic tensions.
Going beyond bilateral effects, the dilution of 
the non-proliferation regime that is the
implicit effect of this agreement—regardless of
its legal outcome—will produce its own 
destabilizing dynamic.
In the end, the greatest uncertainty comes 
from the boldest vector of change in this 
relationship, the political-bureaucratic forces
that sought to sideline proliferation concerns,
a major plank of U.S. foreign policy, in favor
of a new strategic alignment with India. Their
legacy, whether enshrined in law or now, has 
been the transformation of a relationship that
was once mired in suspicion, and that 
habitually shuttled between indifference and
anger, with occasional moments of quiet
cooperation. Even if current legislation fails to
pass the Congress, relations between the two 
countries have changed for the foreseeable 
future. By directly confronting nuclear 
policies—the most sacred of cows, for 
different reasons, in both countries—political
and bureaucratic forces for change have
ensured that there can be no simple return to 
the status quo ante. The polarization of 
interest groups, for and against the agreement,
the radically altered image of India, and the
political and social capital invested in the
course of this struggle, make that impossible. 
At the very least, the condition of bilateral
relations between India and the U.S. has gone
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Appendix: The Great Nuclear Debate 
Before discussing the contours of the debates 
in Washington and New Delhi, I identify key 
aspects of the July 2005 agreement and its later
clarifications. For convenience, these are 
outlined in “bullet points” below.67
In return for acquiring the same benefits 
and advantages available to states “with
advanced nuclear technology”—a phrase
which is read in India as de facto acceptance
of India as a nuclear weapons state (NWS)—
thereby allowing India to regain full access to
the global nuclear industry, India would:
?? Identify and separate its civilian and
military nuclear facilities and 
programs;
?? Place all civilian facilities under full-
scope International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards;
?? Sign the intrusive IAEA Additional
Protocol to cover all declared civilian
facilities;
?? “work with” the U.S. to conclude a
global Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT) and to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction;
?? Pass additional legislation controlling
Indian nuclear exports in conformity
with Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
and Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) guidelines;
?? Refrain from transferring dual-use 
technologies like reprocessing and 
enrichment technology to states that
do not currently have them, and 
support other efforts to limit the 
spread of these technologies;
?? Continue its unilateral moratorium on 
nuclear testing.
It should be noted that India did not 
commit to imposing a ban on the production
of fissile material, kept its reprocessing and
enrichment facilities outside a safeguards
regime, and retained the right to determine for
itself which facilities were civilian and which
were military, now and in the future. India 
later announced that 14 of the 22 power
reactors operating or under construction 
would be considered civilian and would come 
under IAEA safeguards; further, the process of
application of safeguards would take up to
2014 to complete. Additionally, the
Kalpakkam-based ongoing fast breeder
program would not come under safeguards, 
and, the CIRUS reactor in Trombay, India’s
oldest power reactor and source of plutonium
for its 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), 
would be decommissioned in 2010.68
In return for these commitments, the U.S.
would agree to modify its own laws currently
preventing nuclear commerce with India, 
work to change NSG guidelines blocking
India’s access to the international nuclear
industry, and help the IAEA develop a system
whereby India would be guaranteed access to 
nuclear fuel in the case of any inability of
existing suppliers to meet their obligations to
India. Further, the U.S. would offer additional 
fillips, including encouraging Indian 
participation in various international science 
and technology projects.
Writing in July 2006, U.S. the initial
legislative confirmation of the agreement 
signed between India and the United States
has passed (in committee) in both houses of 
Congress.69 On March 16, 2006, the Bush
Administration submitted draft legislation to
both houses of Congress that “waives the
application of certain requirements” of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in order for the
agreement to move forward.70 Also in March, 
it began consulting with the member states of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a cartel 
that exists to restrict the international flow of
materials and technologies that may aid illicit
nuclear proliferation, to propose a “special
exemption”71 for India to receive nuclear fuel
and materials.72 Currently, India lies outside
NSG guidelines as it is not a signatory to the
NPT and does not accept full-scope 
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. Finally,
the U.S. awaits the outcome of the 
negotiations between the IAEA and India
seeking to create a country-specific set of
monitoring guidelines and protocols for
Indian civilian reactors and nuclear facilities.73
Washington, D.C. 
The debate in Washington pits proponents of
an active and robust non-proliferation policy
against those who favor closer and stronger 
ties with India.74 Many on the side of the non-
proliferation lobby recognize the harsh trade-
offs required in the apparent choice before 
them: better ties with India or more robust
non-proliferation. As a result, most preface
their critical comments echoing the language 
used by retired senior congressional
committee staff member Leonard Weiss, who 
helped draft the U.S. Nonproliferation Act
(1978), in his testimony to the House 
International Relations Committee on May 11, 
2006: “Mr. Chairman, I am a strong proponent
of improving U.S.-India bilateral relations.”
Weiss would go on to say “whether nuclear
energy should be the first choice in helping 
India meet its energy needs is questionable … 
But if one is going to have a nuclear
agreement, it ought not to be one that carries
considerable risks and is virtually devoid of 
significant nonproliferation benefits.”75 In 
other words, the policy is right, but the means
are wrong.76 By way of contrast, Richard 
Falkenrath of the Brookings Institution, a
former staff member in the National Security
Council and White House would testify at the 
same session: “One’s assessment of the U.S.-
India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
depends in part on one’s frame of reference. 
Do you view the deal narrowly, as a technical
nonproliferation (or arms control) agreement,
in isolation from all other issues; or do you 
view it broadly, as an element of the United 
States’ effort to cope with the many strategic
challenges we face today and are certain to
face in the future?… The correct frame of 
reference for assessing the Bush-Singh nuclear
deal is U.S. national strategy – that is, the
extent to which it contributes to, or 
undermines, the U.S. ability to manage the
great strategic challenges of our time.”77
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice,
in her testimony to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on April 5, 2006, would
follow this line of argument. She proposed 
that the agreement with India would make the
non-proliferation regime more robust, not less, 
by requiring India to adopt new legislation
and practices that would make it less 
proliferation-likely, that the agreement had
other, positive, externalities, especially 
meeting India’s energy needs in a way that
was less environmentally destructive,78 and 
that a close strategic and commercial
relationship with India was in the U.S.’s best
interests. There was no justification for
comparing India with potential proliferators
North Korea or Iran, she noted, both of which 
were violators of legally binding agreements
they had willingly signed on to, unlike India,
which had never signed the NPT. Rice began
her comments, however, by noting that 
existing nonproliferation policies had had “no
effect” in preventing India and its neighbor,
Pakistan, from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Not only this, but the effect of these policies
had been to “isolate” India and push it closer
to U.S. enemies and commercial rivals. This 
agreement, she argued, would reverse all 
those negatives. 79
Critical reactions to the agreement
focused in particular on three related areas,
which taken together, it is argued, effectively
reduce U.S. nonproliferation policy to a dead
letter. Areas of concern included what might
be called the “weapons effect”: the continued
potential of India to produce fissile material
for weapons; the “incompleteness effect”: the
agreement covered only 65% of India’s
existing and future planned capacity, and the
“multilateral effect”: inferences that would be
drawn from this agreement and the 
international fallout from the “special 
exemption” that was being made for India.
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The weapons effect has to do with the lack
of conditions in the agreement imposing any
restrictions on Indian production of fissile
material.80 It has been known for some time 
that India was running out of domestic 
natural uranium to power its mainstay
pressurized natural uranium-heavy water-
cooled (PHWR) reactors licensed from a 
Canadian design. India’s stock of uranium 
was being used both to fuel these reactors as
well as supply its military program through
the production of plutonium from dedicated 
“research” reactors Dhruva and Cirus.81 With 
domestic supplies of uranium dwindling in 
spite of efforts to open up new mines, and
without access to the international nuclear
market due to international sanctions, India’s 
policy makers appeared to be facing a
Hobson’s choice of having to decide between 
keeping their civilian reactors running or
reducing the buildup of fissile material for its
weapons program.82 Indian efforts to enrich 
uranium to weapons-grade have not reached 
the point where it could have become an
alternative to the plutonium path; in any case,
the same constraint, i.e., lack of natural
uranium, would have applied regardless of
the technical route to weapons production.
This natural limit on Indian production of
fissile material for weapons purposes, it was
argued, offered U.S. negotiators an obvious
point of leverage to pressure India to end the
production of fissile material and to join the 
four NWS that have unilaterally committed to 
end fissile material production. (China’s
adherence to this non-treaty agreement is
unclear). They did not, or more accurately,
were not able to force this condition on India, 
potentially allowing India to divert its
remaining stock of fissile material to strategic
ends, knowing that a reliable source of 
uranium for power production was now 
guaranteed.
The incompleteness effect has to do with the 
scope of the agreement, and the extent of 
coverage of India’s nuclear program. India
currently has 16 power reactors in operation,
with an additional 6 reactors under construc-
tion or planned.83 All Indian reactors are 
owned and operated by the Department of 
Atomic Energy, a government department 
that reports directly to the prime minister’s 
office. Of the 16 reactors currently in 
operation, only four are under IAEA
safeguards. These four include two U.S.-built 
boiling water reactors that run on enriched 
uranium (Tarapur 1 and 2) and the first two
Canadian-licensed PHWR reactors (Rajasthan
1 and 2) that were required to be under full 
safeguards under the original bilateral
agreements between India and its foreign
suppliers. Additionally, Russian engineers are
currently building two 1000 MW VVER 
reactors in Kudankulam in south India that
will come under international safeguards
when completed. In 2003, the IAEA reported
that total nuclear power capacity in India is
2,770 MW (electrical). Under the terms of the
Indo-U.S. agreement, the Indian government 
has agreed to add 14 reactors to the
safeguarded category, equivalent to 65% of 
installed capacity. (The power output of 
currently safeguarded reactors is 19% of total
nuclear capacity). In short, two thirds of
India’s installed capacity of nuclear power
will be under safeguards following the
agreement, though this process will take until
2014 to be complete. Although no official 
statement has been made, it is understood that
reactors located in sensitive and strategic
facilities, namely, the Trombay complex, near
Bombay, and the Kalpakkam complex, near
Chennai, will be off limits for international
inspections. Additionally, India has excluded
its Fast Breeder Reactor program and its 
prototype reactors from any inspection
regime. While India has agreed that all future
civilian reactors will come under safeguards, it
has retained for itself the right to declare
which reactors are civilian and which are not.
The limited scope of the coverage of 
civilian reactors and the exclusion of the fast
breeder reactors have drawn the attention of
critics of the program, especially the latter.
Fast breeder reactors are good plutonium 
producers, raising the fear that these reactors 
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could be used to augment India’s military
weapons program, enhancing the growth of
weapons-capable fissile materials and possibly 
prompting an arms race with Pakistan. This
fear was exacerbated in U.S. domestic debates
by reference to the 2002 estimates of Indian
and Pakistani nuclear arsenals by the Natural
Resources Defense Council that suggested that
Pakistan had a larger arsenal than India,
implying that India had good reason to
continue to build up its arsenal.84
Furthermore, the condition that India would
independently decide the classification of 
future reactors—civilian or military—implies
that no effective limits on fissile material
production are written into the agreement.85
India has however agreed to work with the 
United States towards the conclusion of a 
fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). In most 
experts’ opinion, however, this agreement
does not amount to much, given doubts in the
U.S. about the efficacy of a FMCT,
disagreements on the likelihood of estab-
lishing a strong verification regime, and 
efforts by China and Russia to link the treaty
to an agreement not to militarize outer space.86
The multilateral effect is probably the most
heated and controversial aspect of the U.S.-
India agreement. Critics of the agreement are
deeply concerned with the lessons that 
potential proliferators might draw from the
terms of this agreement. They argue that that
India’s special treatment is tantamount to a
“reward” for openly going nuclear, sending a
signal to potential proliferators that as long as 
they are prepared to weather the initial storm,
the United States will eventually come to
terms with this new development. As former
Senator and co-chairman of the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative (NTI) Sam Nunn put it in an
op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, “Other 
nations—if not today, certainly tomorrow—
will want the same deal as India. How will we
explain to other friends—like Brazil, Taiwan, 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Japan and South Korea—
that India is trusted with nuclear material
production but they are not?… The U.S.-India
deal will likely make it more difficult to get
other nations to join us in threatening nuclear
programs in Iran and North Korea.”87 In his 
testimony to the House International Relations
Committee on May 11, 2006, Leonard Weiss
argued: “By requiring no concessions by India
in the production of nuclear weapons, the
proposed nuclear deal devalues the
commitments made by the 183 non-nuclear 
weapons state-parties to the NPT, some of 
whom are sure to question whether it was
necessary for them to forego the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons in order to receive nuclear
technology assistance. It will surely make it
more difficult to dissuade some countries
from producing their own special nuclear 
materials that terrorists would like to buy or
steal. It will surely make it more difficult to
get other countries to sign and/or ratify the
Additional Protocol that gives the IAEA the 
ability to apply more intrusive nuclear
safeguards measures. It makes cooperation
more difficult in barring nuclear trade with or 
imposing sanctions on countries that have 
suspicious behavior or a record of bad nuclear 
behavior.”88 Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control would tell
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “The
great flaw in the administration’s proposal is
that it considers India an isolated case. This is 
simply impossible… If the United States
decides to drop controls to help one of its
friends—in this case India—other supplier 
countries will do the same for its friends.
China will drop controls on its friend 
Pakistan, and Russia will drop controls on its
friend Iran… The lid will fly off and we may
never be able to get it back on.”89 Synthesizing 
the implications of these shortcomings in the
agreement, critics argue that the outcome of
what I have called the multilateral effect will
transform the behavior of third countries so 
entirely as to undermine U.S. non-
proliferation policy, perhaps fatally.
New Delhi 
The debate in New Delhi was perhaps even 
more intense than its counterpart in
Washington, if located differently; its essence
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was defining the terms under which India and 
the U.S. would be negotiating, especially 
seeking to establish the “red lines” that could
not be crossed. But also, it took place largely 
between the first and second agreements 
signed between India and the United States,
namely, between July 2005 and March 2006.
(By contrast, the U.S. debate could be said to
have only begun in earnest after President 
Bush’s visit to India, when the full import of
the agreement became clear to a wider
community than the small group of experts 
who follow closely the contours of bilateral 
U.S.-India relations). Not surprisingly, the
technicalities of the debate in India were also
different. Unlike in Washington, where the
details of necessary legislative changes 
became the micro-terrain over which larger
battles were fought,90 the main elements of the 
elite discussion included the role of India’s
opaque nuclear program in the context of a
very different world order, and, the 
implications of the deal for national
sovereignty and India’s place in the world.
Properly speaking, the “nuclear debate” 
in New Delhi was really two debates. The first
was the latest confrontation between
opponents and proponents of India’s nuclear 
program qua program, this debate is ongoing;
the second a debate between those who 
argued for a robust and independent nuclear 
posture against others who privileged the new 
relationship with the United States. For the
latter, if better ties with the U.S. required
compromise on some of the key elements of
India’s existing nuclear program, it was a
price worth paying. This debate more or less
ended following the March 2006 agreement,
with those who favored holding fast to a
strong strategic nuclear program having won
the day, as reflected in the relatively few
compromises seen to be made by India.
Critics of India’s nuclear program91
include anti-nuclear activists as well as 
members of the India’s Left political parties.
The Communist Party of India (Marxist), the
main parliamentary force of the Left, holds an 
ambivalent position on India’s nuclear
program—it is for nuclear power and against
nuclear weapons. Its principal concerns about
the Indo-U.S. deal include both the likely
dilution of India’s traditions of anti-
imperialism and policy of equidistance from
great powers. The Left had shown their
political clout by forcing the government to
back down from an initial pledge to send 
troops to Iraq, and was strongly critical of 
India’s changing stance vis-à-vis Iran in the
IAEA’s Executive Council.92 While India has 
traditionally had close ties with Iran, and was 
in the process of negotiating a major energy 
deal with Teheran, India’s delegate to the
IAEA supported the U.S.-backed resolution 
identifying Iran’s nuclear program in “non-
compliance” with its NPT obligations in 
September 2005, a vote in which both Russia 
and China abstained. An independent critic,
Praful Bidwai, notes that this agreement
signals “a decisive departure from India’s 
traditional advocacy of nuclear disarmament.
Instead, India has embraced the one-sided 
agenda of selective nuclear non-proliferation
[favored] by the nuclear weapons-states… By
jumping on the non-proliferation bandwagon,
India… has moved from being a force for 
peace to a force for hegemony.”93
Civil society critics of the Indo-U.S. 
agreement include scientists and anti-nuclear
activists, as well as the National Alliance for 
People’s Movements, the umbrella
organization of India’s massive and influential
social movements. Scientists M.V. Ramana
and Zia Mian, among others, offer the most
extensive and trenchant critiques of the deal,
focusing especially on two factors: a 
misplaced reliance on nuclear power to solve
India’s energy problems, and India’s
continued ability to produce fissile material
for nuclear weapons. Ramana, in a series of
articles, has shown the many shortcomings in
the Indian Department of Atomic Energy’s
(DAE) claims about their ability to solve the
nation’s energy problems. Working in a
context that is notorious for restricting the
public’s access to information about nuclear 
power, he has been able to show that “nuclear
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power would be competitive only with
unrealistic assumptions; for a wider range of 
realistic parameters, it is significantly more
expensive.”94 Ramana points out that the cost 
of waste disposal is never included in DAE 
calculations and notes that major safety issues 
are an ongoing concern, because of the 
Department’s poor record and inherent risks 
associated with nuclear reactor operations,
including the use of highly toxic and volatile
plutonium and sodium in the fast breeder
reactor program. In a recent article in Arms
Control Today Mian and Ramana argue that the
agreement makes easier the diversion of 
scarce fissile material to military ends, as well
as the use of power reactors to produce
military-usable plutonium.95 The effect of the
deal permits a considerable increase in the
Indian nuclear arsenal, leading potentially to a 
new arms race in the sub-continent. They
point out that the deal also does nothing to 
safeguard the plutonium produced as a by-
product of power reactor operations. India’s
stock of spent fuel may contain as much as 
9,000 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium
that can be used to make nuclear explosives.
Although unlikely for reasons including cost
and reliability, this plutonium has the
potential to produce 1,100 weapons, “larger
than that of all the nuclear-weapons states
except the United States and Russia.”96
The overlap in critique from Indian civil 
society critics and U.S. non-proliferation
“ayatollahs” allows for easy demonization of 
these critics as naïve pawns of foreign 
interests and leads to their relative
marginalization in India’s mainstream press
and electronic media. Unlike in the past,
voices critical of the nuclear program are 
rarely included in today’s policy debates. This
does not mean they are not influential, or that
their critiques are not taken seriously, but 
rather that they rarely get the attention, space,
and credit they deserve in the public sphere.
The DAE, in particular, reacts to civil society
critiques by ignoring them when they can, or 
by responding indirectly when they have to,
using a flock of pliable journalists to put out
their institutional point of view. However, it is 
worth keeping in mind that civil society critics
do not seek to influence international relations
as much as they are concerned with the 
deleterious effects of the nuclear
establishment’s behavior on the environment 
and democracy.97
The other nuclear debate took place
among India’s strategic elite.98 The issues over 
which the most concern was expressed 
included (a) separation of civilian and military
facilities; (b) moratorium on testing; (c)
safeguards and the Additional Protocol; (d)
sequencing of actions by India and the U.S. 
The last two issues identified above fall
under concerns over the loss of national 
sovereignty. Immediately following the July
2005 agreement, a flurry of contradictory
statements from various Indian and U.S. 
officials were issued over the sequencing of 
events. Was the U.S. Congress going to 
discuss the agreement before they knew what
India had negotiated with the IAEA? Would 
India have to separate its civilian and military
facilities even before the Congress modified 
U.S. law allowing the deal to go through?
Who would do what first? These and other 
queries filled the airwaves as the implications
of the deal sank into public consciousness and
its textual ambiguities became clearer. 
Similarly, the discussion of the safeguards to 
be applied to Indian facilities, as well as the
scope of the Additional Protocol, took place 
under the same shadow, implying as it did the 
question of how India would be treated by the 
IAEA, as it was not a signatory to the NPT.
The repeated expression of fears of this kind 
reflect a deep-rooted anxiety over actions and
outcomes that appear to dilute national
sovereignty, reminding us of how much India 
remains a postcolonial society in relation to
international politics.
Arundhati Ghose, former Indian represe-
nttative to the U.N. Conference on
Disarmament and hailed for her defense of 
national sovereignty during the CTBT debates,
helped assuage some of these fears by
reminding her readers that India already had 
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IAEA safeguards applied to some of its 
facilities under the terms of the revised
INFCIRC-66 regulations.99 Her own feeling 
was that this feature of the agreement was not
“an insuperable obstacle.” More important for 
strategic planners, however, was the issue of
further testing. In the July 2005 agreement
with the United States, India, which has not
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
committed to continue its unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing. Some have
argued that including this commitment in a
joint bilateral statement comes close to making
it a legal commitment. In recent statements,
the Indian government has rejected that
reading, noting only that India has unilaterally
agreed to end testing, implying that it is at
liberty to resume doing so at a moment of its
choosing. 100
The separation of facilities was
considered to be so expensive, complex, and 
strategically sensitive that it at once became 
the main focus of the elite debate. Speaking 
after the July 2005 agreement between India
and the U.S. was announced, former Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, leader of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, raised fears by
announcing that the separation plan was
tantamount to a cap on the Indian strategic
program.101 It must be remembered that
India’s nuclear program developed in a
political and institutional context where the
line between military and civilian facilities
was always, some would argue intentionally,
fuzzy and ambiguous.102 Although India had 
begun nuclear activities in 1948 via a self-
declared civilian and peaceful program, in 
practice, key technical decisions were made 
keeping possible future military uses in mind, 
to ensure these options were not foreclosed.103
As Indian nuclear practitioners mastered the
full fuel cycle and the range of nuclear
programs and facilities expanded, certain
ancillary technologies, such as de-tritiation
plants, particular reactors, such as Dhruva,
and specific locations, such as Trombay and 
Kalpakkam, would come to be defined 
primarily around strategic ends. However, as
long as India’s nuclear program remained 
officially “ambiguous,” no institutional
distinction was ever publicly made between
the civilian and the military elements of the
Indian nuclear program. In other words, the
exigencies of a civilian-identified but
ambiguous and open-ended nuclear policy
had led, over the years, to a program where
strategic military and civilian facilities,
personnel, and technologies existed alongside
each other. Such spatial ambiguity was a
distinct benefit to a nuclear program that, in
the absence of clear and strong political 
direction, had elevated the practice of keeping 
its options open to an art form. When the July 
2005 agreement between the U.S. and India
required, for the first time, a clear separation
of military and civilian facilities, it led to an
uproar.
The first step in separation was the 
identification of dedicated civilian and
military facilities. As noted above, the
historical development of India’s nuclear 
program had always left the line between
these two objectives intentionally fuzzy. 
Electric power-producing reactors were the
easiest to identify as inherently civilian in
purpose, and the existing Tarapur and 
Rajasthan (RAPS) reactors, as well as the
Kudankulam reactors being built by the
Russians, were already under international 
safeguards. However, some reactors were 
located in strategic complexes and could not
easily be opened up to international scrutiny
without giving inspectors access also to
military facilities. Further, the claim that
unique proprietary technologies were being 
developed in some facilities, notably the
prototype Fast Breeder Reactor and the
Advanced Heavy Water Reactor, meant that
although these are likely to be civilian in 
purpose, they should also be kept away from
international observation for fear of industrial
espionage. At the same time, U.S. negotiators 
were unlikely to be satisfied unless most of 




Finding the correct balance between the 
requirement of greater openness and the 
imputed needs of strategic and technological
secrecy was not easy. The first separation plan
submitted by the Indians to the United States
was turned down. Sharon Squassoni of the
Congressional Research Service writes: “In 
December 2005, Foreign [Secretary Shyam]
Saran visited the United States and according
to press reports, discussed a separation plan
with U.S. officials. Confidentially, admin-
istration officials noted that the plan was not
credible or defensible from a nonproliferation
standpoint, and negotiations will continue.”104
With the Bush visit to Delhi just a month
away, disagreements among Indian policy
makers spilled into the public arena. Seeking
to prevent Indian negotiators from giving in to
U.S. pressure to include the Fast Breeder
Reactor (FBR) program among the facilities to
be opened up to inspection, the head of the
Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Anil
Kakodkar, gave a controversial interview to
the Indian Express. In that interview, he 
identified the FBR as vital for India’s strategic
program: “Both from the point of view of 
maintaining long term energy security and for
maintaining the minimum credible deterrent
(as defined by the nuclear doctrine) the Fast 
Breeder programme just cannot be put on the 
civilian list. This would amount to getting
shackled and India certainly cannot
compromise one for the other.”105 This 
interview was recognized at once as an end-
run around the government and an effort to
influence public opinion by suggesting that
India’s strategic program would be
compromised by the separation plan under
negotiation. The Prime Minister’s Office 
reacted with suppressed fury: “This view is 
just one viewpoint. There are many other
viewpoints which will have to be taken into
account by any government while arriving at
an overall policy decision… the Atomic
Energy Commission is just of the depart-
ments.”106
The exceptional nature of the AEC 
chairman’s comments cannot be stressed
enough. In Indian political culture, a senior
official publicly breaking ranks with the
government and turning to the media to 
express these concerns would normally have 
led to his immediate dismissal. However, the 
government’s hands were tied. Notwith-
standing the Prime Minister’s likely anger at
this intervention, Kakodkar could not be fired
as such an action would be construed as direct
evidence that U.S. pressure on the Indian
government was real, and that his fears were
genuine. In the end, Kakodkar’s ploy was
successful. Whether or not the FBR was ever
on the list for inclusion as a civilian facility,
this rare public statement made it appear that
the government was caving into U.S. pressure, 
ensuring a nationalistic response from across 
the political spectrum. The FBR was now 
defined as a strategic asset, over which there
could be no compromise.107
The struggle would continue until 
President Bush’s arrival in India. Undoubtedly
these very public events would give strength 
to Indian negotiators to hold out and not give
in to U.S. pressure. As late as the day Bush 
arrived in Delhi, negotiations were still
proceeding. According to Indian news
accounts,108 in the end the desire to come away
from India with a completed deal forced U.S. 
negotiators to settle for less than they had
hoped for. While India agreed to a U.S.
demand that all future civilian facilities would
come under safeguards, they also managed to
dilute the extent of that commitment by
mandating that deciding what was civilian,
and what was not, would be entirely India’s
choice to make. In response to the U.S.
demand that safeguards be applied in
perpetuity, Indian negotiators got the U.S. to
agree that fuel supplies would also be
guaranteed in perpetuity.
The separation plan, as it was finally
announced, was structured around two broad 
parameters.109 Certain locations identified as 
strategic—Trombay and Kalpakkam in 
particular—were to remain entirely off limits
to international inspections; and, the measure
of the extent of facilities under safeguards—
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how much of India’s nuclear program would 
be safeguarded—would be determined by the 
quantum of electrical power produced. Hence, 
the Indian government would announce that
65% of India’s nuclear energy producing 
capacity (rather than 65% of India’s nuclear 
reactors) would now come under safeguards. 
It was also announced that the process would 
take place in stages and only be completed by
2014.
The reason the debate largely died down
in Delhi after the President’s visit is because 
most Indian commentators and experts were 
agreed that India had gotten the better of the 
exchange. This view was also expressed in 
private by U.S. experts in Washington. As one
commentator said: “[Indian negotiators]
cleaned our clocks.” This consensus view
forced the opposition parties, including the
right wing BJP and the Left parties, to mute
their criticism of the government’s stance.
Attention now turned to Washington and
Vienna where negotiations with the Congress, 
NSG, and IAEA would commence.
Outcomes
Will this deal make India a more responsible 
nuclear state?
There is no hard evidence that India has ever
shared nuclear technology illicitly or 
irresponsibly with any state.110 This behavior 
will not change because of the deal.
Will India continue testing nuclear weapons?
Although there have been reports that 
scientists would like to conduct further
rounds of nuclear tests, it is well recognized in
India that a renewed bout of testing would
threaten the passage of the agreement in the
U.S. Congress.  India is unlikely to cross this
threshold unless some other country,
particularly China or Pakistan, does so first.
Will this deal be good for the environment?
Not for a long time. Nuclear power stations 
take a long time to get on stream, and even if
the most optimistic assessments of their
eventual contribution to the national grid are
accurate, nuclear power will still be less than
10% of total power generation when all is 
done. At present, non-conventional (wind, 
solar, etc.) sources of energy produce more
power than nuclear energy. Huge capital
investments in new nuclear power stations 
will crowd out further investment in these
safe and clean sources of power. Further, 
electricity from nuclear power stations can 
only substitute for coal-fired thermal power. It
will have no effect on harmful emissions from
petroleum-based vehicles, the numbers of 
which are increasing at very high rates.
Will India be able to produce more fissile material 
for building weapons?
There is no question that the deal reduces the 
constraints on transfers of fissile materials for
potential use in weapons development.
Whether India will actually do so remains
uncertain. One reason to think it will divert
more plutonium into the weapons program in 
the near term is based on past experience. 
India has always sought to keep its nuclear 
options as open-ended as possible so that 
when irreversible decisions need to be made it
has the widest array of choices available to it. 
If India takes seriously its commitment to 
work with the U.S. towards a fissile material
treaty (FMCT), which there is no reason to
doubt, it will want to have as much weapons-
usable plutonium already stockpiled to make
sure it is not handicapped in the future. Even 
if the chances of a rigorous FMCT becoming 
international law soon are small, India will not
take the chance of being caught unprepared, 
especially given the long time lag required for
facilities to shift from one production objective
to another. Hence, they are likely to produce 
as much weapons-usable plutonium as they
can over the next few years to be on the safe 
side, something they would not have done 
were it not for the nuclear deal.
What does this mean for the Indian doctrine of 
minimum credible deterrence?
This term, it is increasingly becoming clear, is 
a moving target. Although when originally 
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propounded, it implied that India would 
restrict its nuclear weapons arsenal to a small 
number of usable warheads (minimum), it now 
appears that the semantic stress has shifted to
credible, which is far more difficult to limit in 
quantitative terms. India’s perceived strategic
threats include both Pakistan and China. As a
result, what is credible deterrence varies
depending on which country is referred to.
India is unlikely to stop building nuclear
weapons until it reaches the numbers
currently estimated to be in the hands of the
smallest NWS: China, France, and Great
Britain. The question of delivery systems is 
closely related to this issue as well, and India
can be expected to seek to continue to increase
its capacity on that front as well. In short, even
with a declared doctrine of minimum credible 
deterrence, India’s true nuclear posture will
remain ambiguous for the future, just as it was 
before the 1998 tests.
Will greater Indian fissile material production lead
to an arms race with Pakistan?
Not necessarily in nuclear weapons, but
possibly in conventional arms. Pakistan is of 
course quite upset about the Indo-U.S. nuclear
deal, especially since the U.S. has made it clear 
that it will not offer Pakistan the same terms
or engage it in nuclear commerce. However, 
Pakistan is not without leverage. As long as
the U.S. remains in Afghanistan, it cannot do 
without Pakistan. Also, the Chinese-Pakistani
relationship is also likely to remain close and
strong, both for reassurance and to keep the
U.S. off balance. Pakistan will continue to
pressure the U.S. to aid them in meaningful
ways to convince them this new relationship
with India is not zero-sum in relation to
Pakistan: increased conventional arms sales 
are the most likely means for the U.S. to 
assuage Pakistani anxieties. India has been a
large purchaser of major weapons systems 
since the early 1990s, this trend is likely to
continue. We can expect the conventional 
arms buildup in both countries to continue for 
some time, though this is likely to have
happened even without the Indo-U.S. nuclear
deal.
How will this deal affect the Indian Department of 
Atomic Energy?
The reorganization of the DAE required by 
this agreement will be significant. There are 
no clear indications on how much the
separation of facilities will cost, or how the
massive proposed new investments will be 
financed. Foreign capital can supplement but 
not replace entirely local funds. Given that
uncertainty, rather than seeing the new
division as simply one of separation of civilian 
and military components, it is more 
appropriate to see it as two separate but 
overlapping divisions: between the strategic
and non-strategic, and between the safe-
guarded and unsafeguarded. The greatest
sector of transparency will be where the non-
strategic intersects with the safeguarded,
primarily the new reactors being built with
foreign assistance. The least transparent will 
be the un-safeguarded and strategic sector,
which includes both the military components
of the nuclear program as well as the sector
where proprietary technologies are being 
developed, notably, the fast breeder reactor 
complex. Beyond the division of facilities,
attention needs to be paid to the main nuclear
regulatory body, the Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board (AERB), and the electricity-
producing wing of the DAE, the Nuclear
Power Corporation. These civilian agencies 
have been largely indistinguishable from the
military and strategic components of the
nuclear program. It is now possible to trans-
form them into responsible and accountable
public entities. For that to happen, however,
personnel in these divisions need to be 
segregated from their former colleagues, and
independent outside experts without ties to
the DAE need to be drawn into the AERB. The 
1962 Atomic Energy Act needs to be revised
again, and the restrictive conditions applying 
to the entire nuclear program, including labor
legislation, need to be modified accordingly.
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It has long been known that the Indian 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is
India’s most secretive government agency, no
small achievement in a governmental
apparatus that still has near-unimpeded 
recourse to colonial-era laws actively
preventing public knowledge of state 
activities. That veil of secrecy has been used
for a half century to prevent the public and
their representatives from knowing what took 
place within the massive nuclear energy 
complex, from the efficiency of reactors to the 
costs of building them. Official secrecy was 
used to cover up technological failures and 
environmental hazards and to intimidate and 
harass the few uncowed members of the press 
seeking to cover the nation’s most sacred of
holy cows. Now with the separation of civilian 
and military facilities, and the application of 
international safeguards to the former, the 
DAE can no longer hide as easily behind a
wall of official denial and deception.
Ingrained bureaucratic habits will not change 
easily, but there is now an opportunity for
civil society activists in India to take 
advantage of these enforced openings and 
force a greater transparency on the DAE’s 
civilian activities than ever before. Not
everything will be visible, of course. The
ongoing breeder reactor program and 
prototype thorium reactors have already 
become the new black holes of the nuclear 
complex—absorbing public light, democratic
gravity, and plenty of unaccountable
resources for decades to come. The DAE’s 
anti-public behavior has been, for half a
century, a scandal in a democratic society.
Now, ironically the result of its own failures
and limitations, it will be forced to come, 
albeit partially, out of its containment dome
and respond as best it can to the demands of 
public scrutiny. This development must stand
as one of the unambiguous highlights of the
new U.S.-India nuclear relationship.
Will this deal strengthen the non-proliferation
regime?
Regardless of the final outcome of the India-
U.S. nuclear deal, the nuclear non-
proliferation regime has taken a major body
blow. Rather than the question of its survival
is the form of its life-support system. Saying 
this does not mean that the regime will 
unravel overnight, or that countries will now 
line up to renounce their obligations to the
treaty. It remains the case that the great
majority of countries of the world, both rich
and poor, do not desire or seek to obtain 
nuclear weapons, and that condition will
remain so regardless of the status of the 
Treaty.111 It is the effect of this deal on the
remaining minority that is the puzzle. It could
be said that the exception being made for
India is very much within the tradition of the
NPT in the first place—a regime built around
an unexceptional date, January 1, 1967—and 
the door has now been opened for further 
exceptions to be made. In effect this is true,
and one of the open questions is whether
other countries will now take on the power to
grant exceptions: so far, the United States has
arrogated that privilege only to itself. What
this means, in effect, is that the treaty has
changed from being a (near) universal
statement of international public and legal
opinion to becoming an instrument of
individual state interest. Its normative quality
has been taken away and only its punitive and 
selective character remains. We will never
know how many countries the Treaty actually
prevented from going nuclear; that number is,
most likely, very small. However, what it did
provide countries was the relative comfort
and security of being a part of the system that 
applied the same rules to almost everybody. 
The mutual loss of sovereignty was the
security-enhancing element of the Treaty, 
making it possible for political leaders to
explain to domestic audiences, without loss of
face or prestige, why no national nuclear 
ambitions were in order. That ineffable
element of the regime is now taken away, and
its loss is one of the most important




1 For the 2005 agreement see www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/pr/2005/49763.htm.  For the 2006 statement see 
www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2006/62418.htm.
2 Dennis Kux, India and the U.S.: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1994).
3 “But more importantly, in the Joint Statement, the United States implicitly acknowledged the existence of our 
nuclear weapons programme.  There was also public recognition that as a responsible state with advanced 
nuclear technologies, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other states which have 
advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States.  The Joint Statement offered the possibility of decades-
old restrictions being set aside to create space for India’s emergence as a full member of a new nuclear world 
order.” Suo Motu statement by the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh (to the Lok Sabha) on Civil Nuclear
Energy Cooperation with the United States.  New Delhi, Feb. 27, 2006.
http://indianembassy.org/newsite/press_release/2006/Feb/18.asp.  Accessed May 26, 2006.
4 Some would include the influence of an Indian-American diaspora in U.S. domestic politics.  While I do not
disagree with the political utility of the diaspora in helping support ongoing initiatives and in blocking policies 
seen as harmful to India, we still lack reliable empirical data on the significance of the diaspora as an
independent force.  For the most forthright proponent of this view, based on anecdotal evidence, see Walter
Andersen, “The Indian-American community comes into its political own,” India Abroad, Sept. 1, 2006.  For a 
different reading of the impact of some sections of the diaspora, see “Making Sense” below.
5 Needless to say, this agreement was widely discussed outside these two capitals as well.  Analysis of the
global conversation is beyond the scope of this study, however, for the view of the IAEA see Mohammed
ElBaradei, “Rethinking Nuclear Standards,” Washington Post, June 14, 2006, p. A23.  Also see Harsh V. Pant,
“The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: The end game begins,” Power and Interest Report, January 27, 2006.
www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=428, p. 3.  Accessed June 13, 2006.  For China’s 
reaction see Mohan Malik, “China Responds to the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” China Brief, vol. 6, Issue 7 
(March 29, 2006). www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415.  Accessed June 13, 2006. 
6 For longer discussions of the history of bilateral relations between the U.S. and India, see Robert J. 
MacMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), Dennis Kux, 
Estranged Democracies, and Shivaji Ganguly, U.S. Policy Toward South Asia. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
1990).  For a contrarian view, see S. Mahmud Ali, Cold War in the High Himalayas: The USA, China and 
South Asia in the 1950s. (New York: St. Martins, 1999).
7 J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and
Personalities (Bombay: Allied, 1970).
8 The earliest (and most successful) example of Indian diplomacy in this regard was the 19-country conference 
on Indonesia, held in Delhi in 1949, which played an important part in putting international pressure on the 
Dutch to relinquish their former colony.
9 Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s view of the world (London: Oxford University
Press, 1968).
10 H. W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-
1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
11 Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1947-
1956 (London: Pinter, 1993).
34
Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement
12 John Lewis Gaddis, What We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997).
13 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 2001).
14 Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Bombay: Allied, 1971); 
Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of the Snows A history of modern Tibet since 1947 (New York: 
Columbia University Press 1999).
15 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, ch. 8. 
16 Ian Graham, “The Indo-Soviet MiG deal and its international repercussions,” Asian Survey vol. 4 (1964):
823–832.
17 But even then odd forms of collaboration continued.  For a discussion of how weather became a weapon of 
the Cold War, see Ronald E. Doel and Kristine Harper, “Prometheus Unleashed: Science as a diplomatic
weapon in the Lyndon B. Johnson Administration,” in Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in
International Affairs, Osiris, vol. 21 (2006): 66–85.
18 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The impact on global proliferation, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1999), p. 125–139.
19 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 134.
20 Itty Abraham, “The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories,” Osiris, vol. 21 (2006): 49–65
21 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, vol. XI, ‘South Asia Crisis’, Doc. 252, p. 705–6.
22 Both the preamble and Article V of the NPT make reference to the potential value of  “peaceful nuclear 
explosions.” India would seek to justify its decision to test a PNE—not a bomb—as falling well within the
mainstream consensus of the time.
23 Abraham, Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb.
24 "Indian Scientist Rejects 'Peaceful' Nuclear Test Claim," Hong Kong AFP, October 10, 1997, in FBIS 
Document FTS19971010000316, October 10, 1997.  This claim was disputed on technical grounds by a senior
colleague: "Indian Scientist Says Ramanna Wrong about 1974 'Bomb'," Asian Age (New Delhi), October 12, 
1997 in FBIS Document FTS19971013001273, October 12, 1997.
www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Nuclear/2296_2892.html.  Accessed June 16, 2006.
25 Paul Leventhal, among others, argues that the executive branch deliberately misled the Congress about the
presence of U.S.-supplied heavy water in the CIRUS reactor, implying that India has been a nuclear “cheater” 
for decades.  “CIRUS reactor’s role in U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement,”
www.nci.org/06nci/04/CIRUS%20Reactors%20Role%20in%20a%20US-India%20Nuclear.htm.  The crux of 
the issue, however, is not whether there was U.S. heavy water in the reactor, but whether the 1974 PNE was in 
fact intended to be a weapons test.  This cannot be independently confirmed as the distinction between a 
peaceful nuclear explosion and a weapons-intended test is technically ambiguous.  See also Michael Barletta, 
“Pernicious Ideas in World Politics: Peaceful Nuclear Explosives,” paper presented at the annual meetings of 
the American Political Science Association, 2001.  Available at 
http://cns.miis.edu/cns/staff/mbarlett/apsa2001.pdf.
26 Zachary Davis, “Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Issues in the 104th Congress,” CRS Issue Brief 91023, 
November 1, 1996.  www.globalsecurity.org/WMD/library/report/crs91-023.htm.  Accessed June 16, 2006.
35
Itty Abraham 
27 By the late 1980s, both India and Pakistan were well on their way to developing nuclear arsenals, and, 
recognizing their mutual capability, Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto signed, in December
1988, the first confidence building measure between the two countries agreeing not to attack each other’s 
nuclear facilities. 
28 Dov S. Zakheim, “Developing a U.S.-India Security Relationship,” in Future Imperilled: India’s Security in
the 1990s and beyond, ed. Bharat Karnad (Delhi: Viking 1994), p. 221.
29 It should be noted that Pakistan falls under U.S. Central Command, which obviates the need for a trade-off—
the India-Pakistan hyphen—from the military point of view.
30 See Stephen J. Blank, “Natural Allies: Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic 
Cooperation,” Strategic Studies Institute monograph, Army War College, Carlisle, PA (Sept. 2005), for more
details. The publication is available at www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi.
31 My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary (New Delhi: UBS Publishers’ Distributors Ltd.,
1996), p. 184.
32 Dixit, My South Block Years, p. 182.
33 See for instance T. N. Srinivasan and Suresh D. Tendulkar, Reintegrating India with the World Economy,
(Washington: Institute of International Economics, 2003).
34 Atul Kohli has recently argued that the transformation of economic policy precedes the 1991 crisis, and in 
fact began in 1980, and should properly be characterized as a pro-business policy, rather than as a pro-market
policy.  See “Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005,” parts 1 and 2, Economic and Political Weekly,
April 1 and 8, 2006.
35 Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan crises in the shadow of nuclear
weapons (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).
36 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (Delhi/Washington:
Viking/Brookings, 2004), p. 37.
37 Talbott, Engaging India, p. 25.
38 www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iunanaummary960708.htm.
39 www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cc_report_exec.html.
40 Interview with former Indian foreign policy official, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2006.
41Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik. “After the CTBT, India’s Intentions,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 
53, no. 2 (March–April 1997).
42 Talbott, Engaging India, ch. 3.
43 Talbott, Engaging India, pp. 52–3.
44 Even Japan, which was conceded in India to have the most justified criticism of the tests, soon decided that 
good relations with India were more important than diplomatic outrage.  In August 2000, Prime Minister
Yoshiro Mori made the first visit of a Japanese Prime Minister to India in a decade.
45 For a first hand account of the U.S. role in ending the Kargil conflict and its aftermath, see Bruce Reidel,
“American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House.” Policy Paper Series, Center for the
36
Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement
Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 2002.
www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/publications/Papers/Riedel_2002.pdf.
46 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The shaping of India’s new foreign policy (New York: 
Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004), p. 7.




49 Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry.
50 “The United States, India and Asian Security,” 5th Asian Security Conference, IDSA, January 27, 2003.
Available on www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/blackwill2htm.
51 “India as a New Global Power: An action agenda for the United States,” (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 34.
52 Interview with Ashley Tellis, Washington, D.C., August 3, 2006.
53 Alan Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, April 6, 2006.
54 “India-U.S. Relations: A general overview,” Embassy of India (no date)
www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/induspol.htm.
55 Tellis, “India as a New Global Power,” p. 13.
56 The terms “regionalists” and “functionalists” are drawn from Engaging India, 28-9. 
57 Interview with Ashley Tellis, Washington, D.C., August 3, 2006. 
58 Krondstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” p. CRS-6.
59 The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb, chs. 1, 7.
60 This condition is not of course exclusive to India, however, the particular path taken by India in this regard is
unique.
61 Transcript of Journalist Roundtable on India, Council on Foreign Relations, February 23, 2006, p. 4.
www.cfr.org/publication/9954/journalist_roundtable_on_india_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html.
Accessed June 21, 2006.
62 For a brilliant analysis of the “event” of Mother India and its significance, see Mrinalini Sinha, Specters of
Mother India: The global restructuring of an empire (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).
63 John D’Emilio, Lost Prophet: Bayard Rustin and the quest for peace and justice in America (New York: The 
Free Press, 2003);
64 Most recently, A Call to Honour: In service of emergent India (Delhi: Rupa, 2006).
65 “What India means to me,” Address to the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(FICCI), New Delhi, July 29, 2003.  www.the-south-asian.com/August2003/robert_blackwill_1.htm.
37
Itty Abraham 
66 Most recently via former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. M.R. Srinivasan.  See “An 
Open Letter to American Senators,” The Hindu, September 22, 2006.
67 See the Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, July 18, 2005, and further
clarification by Dr. Manmohan Singh in the Indian Parliament on Feb. 27, 2006, and especially March 6, 2006 
“Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India’s Separation Plan.”
www.indianembassy.org/newsite/press_release/2006/Mar/sepplan.pdf.
68 Decommissioning the CIRUS reactor is probably also driven by the hope that the dispute about the ‘misuse’
of the reactor will die with it.  What this dispute boils down to is the lack of clarity over whether U.S.-origin 
heavy water was present in the reactor when the plutonium used for India’s 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion 
was generated.  U.S. heavy water was supplied to India without independent safeguards but with a legal promise
not to use it for non-civilian ends.
69 For an overview of the legal issues involved in changing existing statutes, see the testimony of Leonard 
Weiss and Fred McGoldrick to the House International Relations Committee, May 11, 2006.
70 Quotes from the legislative preamble.  Text of the draft legislation is available on the website of the Arms
Control Association (www.armscontrol.org).  Accessed May 26, 2006.
71 Phrase used by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
to testify on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, April 5, 2006, (n.p.).
72 For draft text circulated to NSG members, see Arms Control Association website (fn 2).
73 The lack of full transparency with regard to U.S. discussions with the NSG and IAEA make it difficult to
incorporate any lengthy discussion of that aspect in what follows.
74 An incomplete list of issues addressed in the debate may be found on the following websites Arms Control
Association:  www.armscontrol.org; Henry A. Stimson Center www.stimson.org/?SN=SA20051212930;
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
www.carnegieendowment.org/topic/index.cfm?fa=viewTopic&topic=2000058.
75 Leonard Weiss, ‘Testimony on the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,’ House International Relations Committee, May
11, 2006, p. 1.
76 There are numerous other examples of this framing; instance, Representative Howard Berman, introducing a 
bill in the House: “I am unabashedly pro-India … I’m a member of the House India Caucus, and I strongly 
support efforts to deepen our strategic partnership with the world’s largest democracy.  However, I have serious
concerns about the specific deal Congress is being asked to support.” Press Release, May 19, 2006.
77 Statement before the House International Relations Committee, May 11, 2006, pp. 2–3.
78The claim by Secretary of State Rice and others that the deal would lead to the reduction of harmful
greenhouse gases is not entirely accurate.  Greenhouse gases are produced from both thermal (coal) power 
stations and gasoline burned in internal combustion engines.  While nuclear power may help reduce harmful
emissions from coal, it will do nothing to reduce the emissions from cars and trucks, numbers of which are 
increasing exponentially.  Personal communication with Dr. Rodney Jones, March 3, 2006.
79 Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative, April 5, 2006, p. 1.
80 See Robert Einhorn’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 26, 2006, pp. 5–6.  Two 
recent reports come to opposite conclusions on the fissile material issue.  Ashley Tellis, in a closely argued 
study Atoms for War? argues that India already has more than enough fissile material stock to increase weapons 
38
Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement
production if it should choose to do so.  In his view, the nuclear deal with the U.S. is hence not a factor
independently increasing India’s potential weapons stockpile.  See 
www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18443&prog=zgp&proj=zsa.  Zia Mian et.
al. in “Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the U.S.-India nuclear deal,” reach the opposite 
conclusion, though they do not reflect on the political likelihood of their estimates.  The key temporal variable 
that neither study fully explores is the threshold implied by a completed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and the
urgency that might impose on the Indian military nuclear program. For the draft report see 
www.fissilematerials.org/southasia.pdf.
81 Although plutonium is produced in the normal course of electric power generation in civilian reactors as well,
the level of impurities (i.e., other plutonium isotopes) in this waste under normal functioning makes it less 
effective as a source of military fuel.
82 “The truth is we were desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till the end of 2006.  If this agreement had 
not come through, we might as well [have] closed down our nuclear reactors.”  BBC interview with a DAE 
official quoted in Zia Mian and M.V.Ramana, “Wrong Ends, Wrong Means: Behind the U.S. Nuclear Deal with
India,” Arms Control Today, Jan-Feb. 2006.  http://armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-IndiaFeature.asp.
For the best (if non-identical) estimates of India’ annual consumption of nuclear fuels, see Mian and Ramana,
ibid., and Tellis, Arms for War?
83 Power reactors: (4 safeguarded) Tarapur 1-2, Rajasthan 1-2; (12 unsafeguarded) Kalpakkam 1-2, Narora 1-2, 
Kakrapar 1-2, Kaiga 1-2, Rajasthan 3-4, Tarapur 3-4.  Tarapur 3 has been commissioned and gone critical but as 
of this writing (June 2006) has not joined the electrical grid.  Under construction: Kudankulam 1-2 
(safeguarded), Kaiga 3-4, Rajasthan 5-6 (unsafeguarded).
84 NRDC estimates “contrary to conventional wisdom” suggest that India has 30-35 warheads and Pakistan as 
many as 48. www.nrdc.org/nuclear/southasia.asp.  Accessed June 8, 2006.
85 One expert has argued this could “put the United States in the position of violating its Article 1 commitments
under the NPT if future nuclear sales contribute to an enhanced rate of weapon production by India through the
transfer of indigenous uranium from India’s civilian program to its military program.” Leonard Weiss,
“Testimony,” p. 2.
86 Stephen Rademaker, assistant secretary of state, recently submitted a draft FMCT text to the Conference on 
Disarmament, which excludes verification measures.  See www.us-
mission.ch/Press2006/0518DraftFMCT.html.  Accessed on June 12, 2006.
87 “Nuclear Pig in a Poke,” Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2006, p. 14.
88 Weiss, ‘Testimony,’ p. 2.
89 Gary Milhollin, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 26, 2006, pp. 1–2.
90 A further reason for this difference has to do with the political systems in each country.  The parliamentary
system makes the passage of legislation a fait accompli, hence, once the agreement was signed, there was little 
doubt that the whips of an elected government could get the Lok Sabha to agree to its terms.  However, ease of 
passage of legislation does not correlate with the prior ability to get the consent and support of India’s political 
class, media, and informed public opinion.
91 The most comprehensive collection of writings adopting a critical stance toward India’s nuclear program may
be found at the website hosted by South Asians Against Nukes (SAAN) http://perso.orange.fr/sacw/saan/.
92 Achin Vanaik, “Active Consent,” The Telegraph, October 11, 2005.  The most careful analysis of Iran’s 




93 “India: Down the slippery nuclear slope,” The News International October 29, 2005.
94 “Don’t Switch Over to Nuclear Power,” Economic Times, March 10, 2006.
95 See also Zia Mian et. al. in “Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the U.S.-India nuclear
deal,” www.fissilematerials.org/southasia.pdf.
96 Mian and Ramana, “Wrong Ends, Wrong Means,” p. 6.
97 See the forthcoming essay by M. V. Ramana, “India’s nuclear enclave and the practice of secrecy,” in 
Nuclear Power and Atomic Publics, ed. Itty Abraham (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
98A partial list of institutions where elite debates over India’s strategic, military and foreign policy take place 
include the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Delhi: www.ipcs.org/Nuclear.jsp; Institute for Defense and 
Strategic Analyses, Delhi: www.idsa.in/wmd.htm and Observer Research Foundation, Delhi:
www.observerindia.com/index.htm.
99 “Prospects for Indo-US cooperation in civilian nuclear energy,” IDSA Strategic Comments, Jan. 6, 2006.
www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/arundhati60106.htm.
100 “India committed to unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing,” India Daily, May 26, 2006.
www.indiadaily.com/breaking_news/71862.asp.
101 Bharat Bhushan, “Singh douses security fears, blames N-haze,” The Telegraph July 21, 2005.
www.telegraphindia.com/1050721/asp/nation/story_5015910.asp.
102 Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State
(London/New Delhi Zed Books/Orient Longman, 1998).
103 As Nehru would say during the Constitutional Assembly debate creating the Indian Atomic Energy
Commission (1948): “Of course if we are compelled to use [atomic energy] for other purposes, possibly no 
pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it in that way.” Abraham, The Making of the
Indian Atomic Bomb, p. 49.
104 “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service), updated January 12, 2006, p. CRS-14.  The report indicates that the Senator
Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would apply three criteria to assess the 
robustness of the separation plan: (a) compliance with safeguards, (b) non-assistance to India’s military
program, and (c) transparency.
105 Pallava Bagla, “US shifting goalpost on n-deal: Atomic Energy chief,” Indian Express, Feb. 6, 2006.
106 “Govt. defense US Nuclear Deal,” Economic Times, Feb. 8, 2006.
107 Former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, and once a strident critic of the Indian nuclear
program’s safety record, A. Gopalakrishnan has pointed out that for the FBR to remain outside safeguards, 
other facilities also need to be unsafeguarded in order to be able to supply the reactor with non-safeguarded fuel 
inputs.  For a discussion, see “Civilian and Strategic Nuclear Facilities of India,” IDSA Strategic Comments
Jan. 5, 2006.  www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/gopalakrishnan50106.htm.
108 “I want this deal: Bush told PM” March 4, 2006.  http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/04bush9.htm.
40
Origins of the United States-India Nuclear Agreement
109 Suo Motu statement to the Lok Sabha by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh. “Discussions on Civil
Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the US: Implementation of India’s separation plan.”  March 7, 2006.
http://mea.gov.in/speech/2006/03/07ss01.htm.
110 Recent accusations, especially those offered by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in 
Washington, that India procures items from abroad in violation of non-proliferation guidelines, that it releases
confidential information through its tendering process, and that its export controls are weak, may be dismissed
for the weakness of the evidence provided.  These “revelations” should be seen in the context of the political 
battles underway in Congress, and understood as efforts seeking to influence the debate against the agreement.
www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/indiacritique.pdf.




Working Paper Number 1, May 2004 
Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949 
 Stanley Toops
Working Paper Number 2, October 2004 
China’s Policy on Tibetan Autonomy 
Warren W. Smith 
Working Paper Number 3, January 2005 
Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions 
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. 
Working Paper Number 4, July 2005 
Human Rights in Southeast Asia: The Search for Regional Norms 
Herman Joseph S. Kraft 
Working Paper Number 5, August 2006 
Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict in Southern 
Thailand
 Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana
Working Paper Number 6, November 2006 
Committing Suicide for Fear of Death: Power Shifts and Preventive War 
Dong Sun Lee 
Working Paper Number 7, March 2007 
Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand 
 Imtiyaz Yusuf
Working Paper Number 8, April 2007 
Internal Displacement, Migration, and Policy in Northeastern India 
 Uddipana Goswami
42

